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THE RIGHT TO REGULATE (COOPERATIVELY) 
 







The growing number of new technologies in food production—
such as nanotechnology, genetic modification, animal cloning, and 
irradiation—are garnering different regulatory responses around 
the world.  Based on their threshold for tolerating risk, countries 
are asserting their national right to regulate at home using labeling, 
quarantine, and outright bans on foods.  But domestic regulation 
has its limits in a free trade environment.  Countries that are not 
mindful of treaty obligations could face legal liability, as seen in 
the recent litigation between Uruguay and Philip Morris Interna-
tional.  In short, traditional models of international regulatory co-
operation (IRC) are failing to provide countries with sufficient reg-
ulatory latitude within a free trade framework.   
New Mega-Regional agreements provide a renewed momen-
tum to advance cooperation.  In 2012, President Obama issued an 
executive order to prompt federal agencies to engage in IRC and 
championed two important IRC initiatives, the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
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ship.  Obscured by the criticism of the TPP (including by both ma-
jor parties in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election) is its development 
of a novel framework that promises to integrate domestic regulato-
ry oversight and free trade goals.  As this Article explains, the TPP 
is (1) an exemplar of a Mega-Regional trade framework, (2) a new 
promising mechanism for IRC, and (3) a way to achieve higher 
food safety outcomes.  In so doing, it underscores how the TPP en-
hances regulatory cooperation with a menu of new treaty offerings 
that nudge countries to regulate in ways unrecognized in the IRC 
literature.  Given the rapid pace of new food technologies, the ina-
bility to resolve international conflicts with traditional means, and 
impending trade disputes, the model of IRC developed in this arti-
cle provides an effective solution to a growing challenge in the in-
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1.  INTRODUCTION: A NEW REGULATORY WORLD  
 
We are living in a new regulatory reality marked by two grow-
ing trends.  Across the globe, trade negotiators are busy drafting 
new trade agreements to expand markets.  Meanwhile, at home, 
food regulators are drafting rules to keep pace with the global de-
velopment of new food technologies—such as genetic modifica-
tion, animal cloning, irradiation, and nanotechnology1—in an effort 
to maintain a high level of health and safety protection.  Striking 
the balance between maintaining national policy autonomy while 
opening markets is an increasing challenge.   
Countries have an inherent right to regulate in the public inter-
est, a basic act of sovereignty under international law,2 and they do 
so with varying levels of protection depending on the risk-
tolerance levels of the nations’ respective citizenries.  While this 
fundamental right to regulate is recognized in most free trade 
agreements,3 it has limits.  A new wave of international lawsuits 
                                                 
1 See e.g., Letter from Rosa L. DeLauro et al., U.S. House of Representatives, 
to Michael Froman, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Representative (Oct. 21, 2015) 
http://delauro.house.gov/images/pdf/03.19.15USTRDataLetter.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CT26-ZRS4] (recounting the Vietnam catfish food safety issue) [herein-
after Letter from Rosa L. DeLauro]; see also Froman Says TPP SPS Chapter is Subject 
to Dispute Settlement, with RMM, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 16, 2015 (arguing that the 
TPP includes dispute settlement procedures consistent with food and agriculture 
industry demands). 
2 See generally Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and 
International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L., at 1 (2015) (noting that states re-
tain their authority to regulate in policymaking even when joining the WTO and 
signing international investment treaties) [hereinafter Wagner, Regulatory Space].  
See also Howard Mann, Comment, The Right of States to Regulate and International 
Investment Law, in THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF FDI: POLICY AND RULEMAKING 
PERSPECTIVES, at 189 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
2003) (discussing the balance between a state’s right to regulate and complying 
with trade and investment agreements). 
3 For an example of a trade agreement that reaffirms a country’s right to reg-
ulate, see Preamble to TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Preamble.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y9V2-F5FA] (“Recognize [state’s] inherent right to regulate and resolve 
to preserve the flexibility of the Parties to set legislative and regulatory priorities, 
safeguard public welfare, and protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety, the environment, the conservation of living or non-living ex-
haustible natural resources, the integrity and stability of the financial system and 
public morals”).  See also Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA), Can.-E.U., art. 8.9, para. 1, opened for signature Dec. 2015, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8BQU-36HE] [hereinafter CETA] (“For the purpose of this 
Chapter, the Parties reaffirm their right to regulate within their territories to 
4
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challenging domestic public health regulations illustrates that 
countries are not afraid to invoke international treaties to reverse 
domestic law.4  In an era marked by more agreements and rapidly 
advancing technologies in food production, new forms of regulato-
ry cooperation are needed to provide countries with sufficient reg-
ulatory latitude within a free trade network.  An example illus-
trates this need.  
Take for example nanotechnology.  The “Gobstopper” – a round, 
brightly-colored, marble-like confectionery made of sugary layers 
sold in grocery stores in the United States.  Gobstoppers are coated 
with submicroscopic particles (nanoparticles), which measure less 
than 100 nanometers (technology at the scale of atoms and mole-
cules) of titanium dioxide,5 an ingredient commonly added to plas-
                                                                                                               
achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, 
the environment or public morals, social or consumer protection or the promotion 
and protection of cultural diversity.”).  The language in the European Union-
Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, Article 13 bis, para. 1, is nearly the same.  Euro-
pean Union-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, E.U.-VT, opened for signature Feb. 1, 
2016, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_
154210.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8TG-UWG4].  
4 For an example of a challenge to domestic legislation, see the international 
investment litigation between Philip Morris International and Australia and Uru-
guay, respectively.  In both cases, the countries defended public health measures 
and won.  In Australia’s case (decided 17, December 2015), the investment treaty 
was a Hong Kong-Australia Bilateral Investment Treaty.  Philip Morris Asia, Ltd. 
v. Australia, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility PCA Case Repository No. 
2012-12, (Hong Kong Treaty Arbitration Tribunal), http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SFB-
MEDY].  For a discussion of the genesis of this case, see Wagner, Regulatory Space, 
supra note 2, at 6 – 7. 
 In Uruguay’s case, decided in July, 2016 the investment treaty was a Uruguay-
Switzerland investment treaty.  Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (July 8, 2016), 
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/content/press_office/2016/2016_07_08_
uruguay.pdf  [https://perma.cc/BQ33-YQME].  
 In 2016, the United Kingdom’s High Court upheld its country’s plain packag-
ing law, and the European Union’s Court of Justice upheld its new tobacco regula-
tions, including a requirement for large, graphic health warnings for EU countries 
to adopt plain packaging.  British American Tobacco et. al v. Dept. of Health 
(2016), EWHC 1169 (Admin), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/bat-v-doh.judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DCY-
XXPP]; Press Release No 48/16, Court of Justice of the European Union, The new 
EU directive on tobacco products is valid (May 4, 2016), 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-
05/cp160048en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DEG-N68X].  
5 See Ravi Ravichandran, Nanotechnology Applications in Food and Food Pro-
cessing: Innovative Green Approaches, Opportunities and Uncertainties for Global Mar-
ket, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GREEN NANOTECHNOLOGY: PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY, 
5
Marks: The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
  
6 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
tics, paint, cosmetics and sunscreen, and is also a food additive 
used in hundreds of foods6 to whiten or brighten color.7  And be-
cause it contains nanoparticles of this approved food additive, a 
Gobstopper can be considered a nanofood.8  
Countries are racing to regulate nanotechnology.  While in the 
U.S., nanofoods are Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-
approved and generally recognized as safe,9 other countries limit 
nanotechnology in foods due to concerns that ingested nanoparti-
cles are so small that they may interact with cells or behave differ-
ently than their larger counterparts.10  The European Union has 
approved nanotechnology ingredients but requires labeling,11 a 
                                                                                                               
Vol 1:2, 72, 85 (2010) (noting other nanoparticle used in foods, such as: silicon di-
oxide, iron oxide, silver, gold, and aluminum). 
6 See generally World Health Organization, FAO/WHO Expert Meeting on the 
Application of Nanotechnologies in the Food and Agriculture Sectors: Potential Food Safe-
ty Implications, Food and Agriculture Association of the United Nations and World 
Health Organization, Meeting Report (2010), http://www.evira.fi/
attachments/elintarvikkeet/elintarviketietoa/fao_who_nano_expert_meeting_
report_final__2_.pdf [https://perma.cc/56ZQ-KZUM] [hereinafter FAO/WHO 
Expert Meeting].  
7 Id. FAO Report, Appendix 4 (listing “current and projected nanotechnology 
applications in the food and agriculture sectors” in FAO study).  See also Susan 
Gaidos, Noshing on Nano: The tiny particles in what we eat raise big questions, 188 SCI. 
NEWS 18 (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/nanoparticles-
foods-raise-safety-questions [https://perma.cc/D4F9-YHK6] (explaining that “ti-
tanium dioxide nanoparticles are frequently added to foods to whiten or brighten 
color.”).  See generally David Julian McClements, Nanoscale Nutrient Delivery Sys-
tems for Food Applications: Improving Bioactive Dispersibility, Stability and Bioavailabil-
ity, 180 J. FOOD SCI. 80, N1602 (July 2015) (discussing the use of nanotechnology in 
food production).  
8 See Gaidos, supra note 7, at 18 (noting that the Gobstopper candy includes 
submicroscopic particles of titanium dioxide, a food additive).  
9 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY OF COLOR ADDITIVES FOR USE IN THE 
UNITED STATES IN FOODS, DRUGS, COSMETICS, AND MEDICAL DEVICES (2015) 
[https://perma.cc/7SE9-76HD] [hereinafter FDA, SUMMARY OF COLOR ADDITIVES]. 
10 Id. at 19 (including a list of approved color additive for use in food, drugs, 
cosmetics, and medical devices). 
11 See generally CHRISTIAN HÄBERLI, WORLD TRADE INSTITUTE, A Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement: Implications for Swiss Agriculture, 
at 15, http://www.nccr-trade.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccr-trade.ch/wp5/
publications/Haeberli_TTIP_Implications_for_Swiss_Agriculture.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N4E4-DGUH] [hereinafter Haberli, Implications for Swiss Agri-
culture]. For the U.S. nanotechnology requirements, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
NANOTECHNOLOGY (2009) (noting that the FDA regulates products, not technolo-
gies). 
   In the United States, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) require 
manufacturers to demonstrate that the food ingredients and food products are not 
harmful to health.  Yet this regulation does not specifically cover nanoparticles, 
6
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move which ultimately limits Gobstopper exports and can be per-
ceived as a trade barrier.   
The problem is that ultimately these disparate regulatory ap-
proaches may lead to a trade-related dispute because traditional 
forms of international regulatory cooperation (IRC) have difficulty 
resolving disputes related to new food technologies.12  Generally, 
IRC is made up of arrangements (e.g., provisions in trade agree-
ments, international organizations, and standards) like the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), that “promote cooperation in the de-
sign, monitoring, enforcement, and management of regulation to 
support consistent rules among Members.”13  But the WTO relies 
upon international organizations to set standards for new technol-
ogies and, as is the case with many new technologies, no interna-
tional standards are available for nanofoods.14  In addition, politi-
cal and philosophical tensions often related to new technologies 
                                                                                                               
which could become harmful only in nanosized applications. Thus no special reg-
ulations exist for the use of nanotechnology in the food industry. 
12 For instance, if two countries bring a claim to the WTO, the country violat-
ing the WTO rule may decide to continue to violate the trade rule and merely pay 
a penalty.  The issue remains unresolved.  See Memorandum of Understanding, 
European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/28 (Sep. 30, 2009), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/
november/tradoc_145411.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6QY-MJYE] [hereinafter EU-
Meat Products] (listing an example of such a dispute).  
13 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Mapping A Hidden World of International Regulatory 
Cooperation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 267 (2015) [hereinafter Dunoff, Mapping a 
Hidden World].  See also Céline Kauffmann & Nikolai Malyshev, Think Piece, Inter-
national Regulatory Co-operation: The Menu of Approaches, OECD E15 Task Force on 
Regulatory Systems Coherence at 1 (Oct. 2015), http://e15initiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Regulatory-Kauffmann-and-Malyshev-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KM8K-6XQV] (explaining that “governments use and com-
bine a broad range of formal and informal, broad and specific mechanisms to 
achieve their co-operation objectives” regarding economic regulation) [hereinafter 
Kauffman & Malyshev, International Regulatory Cooperation].  
14 See Steve Suppan, Racing Ahead: U.S. Agri-nanotechnology in the Absence of 
Regulation, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y at 4 (June 2011), 
http://www.iatp.org/files/2011.6.29%20AgriNanotech%20SS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PG45-YSYR] (noting, in July of 2011 that the Codex Commission, the 
international food–setting organization, may consider whether or not to include 
nanotechnology in its strategic plan for 2013-2018); FAO/WHO Expert Report, 
supra note 6, at 88 (showing that the current Codex plan does not include nano-
technology).  See also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Strategic Plan 2014 – 2019, 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/StrategicFrame/Strategic_plan_2014_2019_
EN.pdf (stating that it will address emerging food safety and nutrition issues to 
include scientific and technological innovation which may include nanotechnolo-
gy).  
7
Marks: The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
  
8 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
prevent adequate dispute resolution.15  The slow pace of global 
standard-setting in this area and the inability of the WTO to re-
solve these issues, signals a need for a ‘right to regulate coopera-
tively’—or a right to access new mechanisms for regulatory coop-
eration.    
This Article argues that, when it comes to food safety, the 
harms caused by regulatory pluralism outweigh the benefits.16  The 
Gobstopper example, and others, illustrate that the need for more 
harmonization of standards, guidelines, and processes is driven by 
foods perceived as risks,17 intensifying regulatory differences with 
                                                 
15 In a hypothetical WTO Claim, the United States would argue that the regu-
lation (or ‘trade measure’ in the WTO) violates a relevant WTO agreement.  The 
ban could be upheld by a WTO Panel if justified using scientific evidence and if 
no international standard on nanofoods exists.  Two long standing unresolved 
WTO disputes are EU-Bananas and EU-Hormones.  See Commission Regulation, 
No. 2257/94 (Sept. 16, 1994) (laying down the Quality Standards for Bananas 
within the European Communities).  See also EU-Meat Products, supra note 12, at 1 
(presenting a memorandum of understanding between the US and EU on meat 
quality). See e.g. THOMAS HALE, DAVID HELD & KEVIN YOUNG, GRIDLOCK: WHY 
GLOBAL COOPERATION IS FAILING WHEN WE NEED IT MOST (2013) (arguing that trea-
ties and other forms of legal cooperation are increasingly inadequate). 
16 For an argument based on benefits, see Kauffmann & Malyshev, Interna-
tional Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 13, at 1 – 4 (noting “divergences threaten 
coordinated policy action, hamper interoperability, and raise… costs for business-
es and citizens”, versus the benefits, including increased trade, investment and 
GDP, “administrative efficiency gains and cost savings for government, business 
and citizens” and “societal benefits such as improved safety” and environmental 
sustainability.).  See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT (OECD), INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: ADDRESSING 
GLOBAL CHALLENGES 15 (2013) (noting that the single largest obstacle to enhanced 
international trade is the persistence of disparities between nations’ regulations); 
Benjamin M. Weadon, International Regulatory Arbitrage Resulting from Dodd-Frank 
Derivatives Regulation, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 249,  251, 259 (2012) (noting that lack 
of international harmonization creates the possibility of regulatory arbitrage) 
[hereinafter Weadon, International Regulatory Arbitrage].  For an argument based 
on costs, see Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Ap-
proach, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 83 (2014) (noting a benefit of regulatory pluralism 
for global financial markets is scope of available regulatory actions); Managing 
Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, at 77 – 83  (arguing that that there 
are no common global rules for financial regulation to combat financial arbitrage 
and even if there were, national governments would not be willing to adopt those 
rules). 
17 See Larry Keener, Sophia Nicholson-Keener, & Tatiana Koutchma, Harmo-
nization of Legislation and Regulations to Achieve Food Safety: US and Canada Perspec-
tive, 94 J. SCI FOOD AGRIC, 1947, 1951-52 (2014) (noting similarities between the 
United States’, Food Safety Modernization Act, and Canada’s Safe Food For Ca-
nadian’s Act, and noting that nearly half of the foodborne illness outbreaks re-
ported in the United States between 2009-2010 were associated with imported 
food, implicating foods imported from areas which previously had not been asso-
ciated with outbreaks). 
8
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regard to emerging technologies in food production,18 differences 
in regulatory approaches, and WTO disputes, both current and 
imminent. 
New agreements are emerging to provide stronger commit-
ments to IRC in an effort to reduce current and future regulatory 
differences.19  In 2012, President Obama issued an Executive Order 
prompting U.S.  federal agencies to engage in IRC20 by asking them 
to identify regulations that are likely to have significant interna-
tional impact and to consider the regulatory frameworks adopted 
by foreign governments in appropriate circumstances.21  Under the 
Executive Order, Obama championed two new IRC initiatives or 
Mega-Regionals: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship (TTIP)—between the United States and the European Union—
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 12-nation pact between 
the United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vi-
etnam.22    
Mega-Regionals are deep-integration partnerships between 
countries or regions with a major share of world trade and foreign 
direct investment, in which two or more of the parties are hubs in 
global value chains.23  This new type of agreement, tossed into the 
“spaghetti bowl”24 of already existing trade agreements25 is a de-
                                                 
18 See EU-Meat Products, supra note 12, at 1 (discussing the importation of 
meat products treated with hormones and the increased duties on importers). 
19 See Haberli, Implications for Swiss Agriculture, supra note 11, at 4 (explaining 
that “the most far-reaching objective—and this is where TTIP innovates in respect 
of any other RTA—was finding a common road map committing the TTIP Parties 
to solve even future regulatory differences.”). 
20 Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 – 26,415 (May 1, 2012) (E.O. 
13,609 is overseen by the Office of Management and Budget and directs agencies 
subject to presidential regulatory review to summarize their international regula-
tory cooperation activities in their Regulatory Plans and to minimize unnecessary 
differences between U.S. regulatory requirements and those of key trading part-
ners both in promulgating future rules and in conducting retrospective review of 
existing rules).  
21 Id.  
22 Other Mega-Regionals being negotiated are: Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership (TTIP), the 16-member Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) and the 24-member Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). 
23 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: GAME-




24 The term was first used by Jagdish Bhagwati in U.S. Trade Policy: The Infat-
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parture from other agreements in that they involve a range of sub-
jects and an ambitious scope, going beyond reductions in tariffs, to 
address other trade barriers.  
This Article focuses on the TPP, an agreement slated to amass 
one third of world trade,26 prioritize regulatory cooperation,27 set 
higher standards than those found in other trade agreements,28 and 
raise the value of trade among its signatories by 2025.29  This Arti-
                                                                                                               
uation with Free Trade Areas.  Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation 
with Free Trade Areas, in Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne O. Krueger, THE DANGEROUS 
DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, 1 (AEI Press, 1995).   
25 See Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, Mega-regionals:  What is going on? in Mega-
Regional Trade Agreements: Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trad-
ing System?, WORLD ECON. F. at 13, (July 2014) http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_MegaRegionalTradeAgreements_
Report_2014.pdf  [https://perma.cc/9GSA-2N62] (last accessed 10/15/16).  Ex-
amples are the 160-Member World Trade Organization, 432 Regional Trade 
Agreements (238 of which are in force), and 3,196 International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs) which include BITS and other IIAs.  
26 See IAN FERGUSSEN, MARK MINIMY, & BROCK WILLIAMS, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) 
NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS at 5 (Mar. 20, 2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL7K-S5CJ] 
(“Economically,  TPP  would  bind together a group that represents 40 percent of 
global GDP and about a third of world trade”). 
27 Trans-Pacific Partnership (released on Nov. 12, 2015), https://ustr.gov/
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text 
[https://perma.cc/D52Q-JN56].  See also European Union Ambassador Says Eventual 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Will be Tough to Pass, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE, Oct. 30, 2015 (discussing obstacles to adopting free trade deals). See 
EU Ambassador Says Eventual TTIP Deal will be Tough to Pass, Sees CETA as Test 
Case, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 30, 2015, at 1 (explaining EU Ambassador David 
O’Sullivan’s statements, that the TTIP, once reached, will face a tougher battle to 
passage than previous free trade agreements in the EU because of the false notion 
that the TTIP will “force EU governments to give up their authority to regulate”).  
28 For some member-nations, standards will be much higher while for oth-
ers, they will be only slightly higher, varying by industry.  This paper argues that 
food safety standards will be higher for all TPP members.  Contra Dan Stanton, 
TPP Five years data protection for Biologics in the US-Asia Trade Deal, (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://www.biopharma-reporter.com/Markets-Regulations/TPP-Five-years-
data-protection-for-biologics-in-US-Asia-trade-deal [https://perma.cc/686S-
USNS] (discussing the TPP biologics debate.  Noting that in the U.S. biologic 
pharmaceuticals receive 12 years of patent protection while in some TPP member 
nations there is no protection. In the end, the bargained-for number of years of 
TPP protection is 5 [not the highest (12), nor the lowest (0)]).  
29 See Global Trade Analysis Project, Purdue University, GTAP Resource Re-
port #4118, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?
RecordID=4118 [https://perma.cc/A5Q5-T3L7] (quantifying the economic effects 
of the proposed TPP by using the GTAP model with the GTAP v8 2007 database, 
updated to 2014).  Here, two scenarios were modeled between 2014 and 2025—the 
assumed implementation period for the TPP.  The “baseline scenario” simulates 
10
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cle explains that, obscured by criticism of the TPP,30 compared to 
prior trade agreements, the TPP develops a novel framework that 
promises to integrate domestic regulatory oversight and free trade 
goals.  
Since Mega-Regionals are a new feature to the international 
economic system, the current literature fails to account for the role 
that these new agreements can play as drivers for regulatory coop-
eration and food safety.  This Article argues that new agreements 
carry forward the successes of prior agreements and the ability to 
urge cooperation to raise global food safety standards.  It extends 
my previous work on food safety governance by arguing that 
Mega-Regionals have the potential to encourage greater food safe-
ty.31  And, it supports the prevailing wisdom in policy debates and 
academic literature that problems related to regulatory differences 
can be counteracted with measures (such as TPP provisions and 
conflict avoidance mechanisms) to harmonize rules across all legal 
systems.32  
This Article specifically examines how food law concerns can 
be incorporated into the current international regulatory regime, 
and calls for a new model or regulatory cooperation via Mega-
Regional trade frameworks along the lines of the TPP.  In so doing, 
this Article seeks to extend the existing literature on global food 
                                                                                                               
projected growth in GDP and endowments, changes in diets, and the implementa-
tion of preferential and unilateral tariff reforms already committed to in the re-
gion.  A “TPP” scenario adds a hypothetical, full elimination of intra-TPP tariffs 
and tariff-rate quotas to the network of trade agreements.  Results show that the 
U.S. will supply one-third of the expansion in intraregional agricultural exports—
U.S. agricultural exports to TPP partners in 2025 is estimated to be 5% ($2.8 bil.) 
higher in 2025 due to the TPP.  Japan will account for 70% of growth in intrare-
gional agricultural imports—the value of its agricultural imports from its TPP 
partners in 2025 is expected to be 14% ($5.8 bil.) higher than the baseline. 
30 See Dan Ciuriak & Harsha Vadhana Singh, Think Piece, Mega-Regionals and 
the Regulation of Trade: Implications for Industrial Policy, E15 Expert Group on Rein-
vigorating Manufacturing: New Industrial Policy and the Trade System Think 
Piece, WORLD ECON. F., at 6, 9, (Mar. 10, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2576887 [https://perma.cc/948F-W9NU] (discussing 
how criticisms related to transparency, participation, and regulatory impact, are 
assessments that advantage business groups or countries with greater resources). 
31 See Alexia Brunet Marks, A New Governance Recipe for Food Safety Regulation, 
47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 3, 907 (2016) [hereinafter Brunet Marks, Recipe for Food Safety] 
(comparing food safety protections in the WTO Agreements with those found in 
other Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements, and standards found in the pri-
vate sector. Mega-Regionals are new treaty agreements which provide higher 
food safety protections compared to other agreements, short of private standards). 
32 See Weadon, International Regulatory Arbitrage, supra note 16 (noting that 
lack of international harmonization creates the possibility of regulatory arbitrage).   
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safety33 and international regulatory cooperation,34 and contribute 
                                                 
33 See e.g. Ching-Fu Lin, SPS-Plus and Bilateral Treaty Network: A ‘Global’ Solu-
tion to the Global Food Safety Problem? 29 WIS. INT'L L.J. 694 (2012) (discussing and 
offering recommendations on the role of multilateralism and bilateralism in tack-
ling global food-safety problems); Ching-Fu Lin, Global Food Safety: Exploring Key 
Elements for an International Regulatory Strategy, 51 VA. J. INT’L. 637, 637 (2010) (ana-
lyzing “the nature of the global food safety crisis against the background of eco-
nomic globalization and the growing threat of foodborne diseases.”); see also 
Stephanie Tai, Food Systems Law from Farm to Fork and Beyond, 45 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 109, 110 (2015) (discussing the “systems-oriented” approach to food policy); 
Tetty Havinga, Private Regulation of Food Safety by Supermarkets, 28 LAW & POL’Y 
515, 515 – 533 (2006) (discussing the case study of a Dutch retailer to show how 
market power can be used to force changes in food policy); Elizabeth Trujillo, 
Draft, NEW VISIONS FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, (Monograph), 
Cambridge University Press (forthcoming, 2017), copy with author; Alberto Ale-
manno, The Shaping of European Risk Regulation by Community Courts (Jean Monnet, 
Working Paper 18/08, 2008) at 2, 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/08/081801.html [https://
perma.cc/B5VH-M5B9] (discussing the “main distinctive attributes of the emerg-
ing European risk regulatory model.”); Alberto Alemanno, The Multilateral Gov-
ernance Framework for Food Safety: A Critical and Normative Overview 9-45, in FOOD 
SAFETY, MARKET ORGANIZATION, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (Abdelhakim Ham-
moudi et al. eds., Springer Publishers: New York 2015) (providing a systematic 
analysis of the multilateral governance framework for food safety and comment-
ing on areas of fragmentation); Alexia Brunet Marks, The Risks We Are Willing to 
Eat: Food Imports and Safety, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 125 (2015) (arguing that the Food 
Safety Modernization Act’s efforts to increase food safety will be undercut by the 
growing complexity of international trade); Brunet Marks, Governance Recipe for 
Food Safety, supra note 31 (discussing the new system of private standards for food 
safety and its accompanying short comings). 
34 See e.g. Reeve T. Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International 
Regulatory Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 51 (2015) (proposing a 
framework for “scrutinizing existing U.S. regulations and eliminating unneces-
sary international disparities in an effort to encourage regulatory convergence.”) 
[hereinafter Bull]; Ching-Wen Hsueh, A Greener Trade Agreement: Approaches to En-
vironmental Issues in the TPP Negotiations 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L & POL'Y 
521 (2013) (discussing the environmental impact of TPP adoption and the efficacy 
of the enforcement mechanism); C. Boyden Gray, Upgrading Existing Regulatory 
Mechanisms for Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 
32 (2015) (suggesting means by which progress on “regulatory cooperation under 
imperfect political circumstance” can be achieved.”); Jonathan B. Wiener & Alber-
to Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning 
Process Toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (2015) 
[https://perma.cc/A33Y-S2GP] (discussing international regulatory cooperation 
systems variations and the lessons that can be learned from them); Reeve T. Bull 
et al., New Approaches to International Regulatory Cooperation: The Challenge of TTIP, 
TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2015) 
[hereinafter Bull et. al. New Approaches] (discussing governance, incentives, and 
obstacles facing the growth of international regulatory cooperation); Dunoff, Map-
ping a Hidden World, supra note 13 (presenting a general survey of international 
regulatory cooperation); Terence C. Halliday & Greg Shaffer eds., TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS, 5 (Oxford University Press, 2015) (noting that IRC activity among 
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to the ongoing discussion on the right to regulate.35  It also contrib-
utes generally to the academic literatures on global administrative 
law36 and the emerging literature on global organizational ecolo-
gy.37  
                                                                                                               
different institutional organizations); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International 
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (2002) (discussing the decline of liberal internationalist organization for 
international regulatory cooperation, and the growth of the adaptable and decen-
tralized network model for IRC); Claire R. Kelly, Institutional Alliances and Deriva-
tive Legitimacy, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605 (2008) (discussing the means by which insti-
tutional organizations gain legitimacy and its effect on member states).  
35 This discussion is found within the nascent field comparing international 
investment and international trade law.  See e.g. Wagner, Regulatory Space, supra 
note 2, at 15 (discussing the level of regulatory autonomy possessed by states in 
the international investment and international trade regimes); Howard Mann, The 
Right of States to Regulation and International Investment Law: A Comment, in THE 
DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF FDI: POLICY AND RULEMAKING PERSPECTIVES (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2003) at 211 – 225,  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20034_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFP2-TS3Z] 
(arguing that “reshaping of the purpose of investment agreements from protect-
ing foreign investors to creating investment agreements for sustainable develop-
ment” properly respects a state’s right to regulate); Joel Trachtman, FDI and the 
Right to Regulate: Lessons from Trade Law, in THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF FDI: 
POLICY AND RULEMAKING PERSPECTIVE (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 2003), at 189 – 205, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20034_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YFP2-TS3Z] (analyzing international trade law interaction 
with domestic law, and applying the insights to international investment law); M. 
Sornarajan, Right to Regulate and Safeguards, in THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF 
FDI: POLICY AND RULEMAKING PERSPECTIVES, (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, 2003), at 205 – 211, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20034_
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFP2-TS3Z] (analyzing international investment 
agreements for the loss of sovereignty and the related exceptions that follow from 
joining); Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology 
of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 875, 885 (2011) (summarizing the 
existing literature on international investment law and its changing nature). 
36 See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence 
of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2004) (discussing the 
shift in focus in literature on international investment law due to changing socio-
logical conditions). 
 The global administrative law writings usefully address interactions among 
international organizations, but do not fully address the regulatory interactions 
among regulators.  
37 See e.g. Greg Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change: Opportuni-
ties and Constraints, LAW AND SOCIETY INQUIRY (2011) (providing an analysis of the 
migration of transnational legal norms); Greg Shaffer and Terrence C. Halliday 
eds., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, (2015), (defining transnational legal process-
es and measuring their effects and limits); Friedrich A. Hayek, THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE: STUDIES ON THE ABUSE OF REASON (1952) (noting that public 
regulation is always one step behind the private market); see also Abraham L. 
Newman & David Zaring, Regulatory Networks: Power, Legitimacy and Compliance, 
in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
13
Marks: The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
  
14 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
The analysis proceeds in four parts, followed by a conclusion.  
Part II defines international regulatory cooperation and makes the 
case for more regulatory cooperation focusing on food safety and 
other factors.  Parts III and IV describe the problem and provide 
the solution—a conceptual framework for regulatory cooperation 
using the TPP as an example.  Part V shows how mechanisms 
aimed at regulatory cooperation may create externalities.  Part VI 
concludes.  
 
2.  A GROWING DEMAND FOR MORE REGULATORY COOPERATION      
 
The following describes IRC and identifies the need for more 
cooperation in global food safety as driven by:  (1) the rising threat 
of foodborne illness and food safety; (2) different regulatory phi-
losophies creating tension within international trade; (3) regulatory 
”collisions” (take for example a WTO dispute)38, and (4) ‘imminent’ 
regulatory collisions.   
 
2.1.  Defining International Regulatory Cooperation   
 
International Regulatory Cooperation (IRC) originated during 
the postwar era and operates today through a framework of inter-
national organizations and treaties addressing different fields.  
Broadly speaking, IRC involves domestic officials from different 
jurisdictions interacting to jointly address issues of mutual con-
cern.39  Examples include the United Nations Declaration on Hu-
man Rights and, in the economic realm, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).40  While there are several academic arti-
cles which provide a typology of IRC,41 it embraces harmonization, 
                                                                                                               
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART at 244 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 
2013) (reviewing scholarship on regulatory networks). 
38 See EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, supra note 12 (provid-
ing a Memorandum of Understanding for the importation of beef into the Euro-
pean Community). 
39 See Dunoff, Mapping a Hidden World, supra note 13 at 268 (stating that since 
the focus is on interactions among domestic regulators, this does not include other 
important forms of international regulatory cooperation such as interactions 
among actors from different international organizations and private regimes).  
40 Id. at 271 – 73 (a historical perspective on the origins of IRC). 
41 Id. at 273 – 74 (discussing the typology of IRC aggreements).  See also, 
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“a process in which diverse elements are combined or adapted to 
each other so as to form a coherent whole while retaining their in-
dividuality”.42  Professors Jagdish Bhagwati and the late Robert 
Hudec wrote extensively on the general characteristics of harmoni-
zation as a way to pool regulators’ resources in developing stand-
ards for public health protection, reducing industry compliance 
costs in the global market, and minimizing impediments to bring-
ing safe food to consumers.43  The following discussion provides 
examples of countries cooperating in ways that harmonize regula-
tory differences, focusing on food safety.  
Countries engage in IRC through several techniques along a 
continuum, from fully uncoordinated regulatory heterogeneity to 
fully uniform regulatory homogeneity (convergence).44  Coopera-
tive regulation can involve a country engaging in any of a number 
of techniques  to reduce regulatory differences.45  The vehicle for 
using the technique can be a free trade agreement, international 
agreement, a standard-setting organization in a specific area, bilat-
eral cooperation among domestic regulators, an international or-
ganization, or a Mega-Regional.46  While countries adopt IRC tech-
niques to achieve certain objectives, I focus on achieving higher 
levels of food safety.  The techniques described below are useful 
for mapping the prevailing food safety goals and for illustrating 
how Mega-Regionals expand IRC. 
Moving from fully uncoordinated regulatory heterogeneity, 
countries initiate regulatory cooperation through dialogue and 
procedural soft law, informally exchanging information to foster 
mutual understanding and cooperation.  Examples of these non-
                                                                                                               
Kauffmann & Malyshev, International Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 13 at 1 – 3 
(providing a typology of the continuum of IRC agreements). 
42 Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 699, 
702 (1991).  
43 See generally FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE 
TRADE? (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) (multiple authors dis-
cussing harmonization and divergence in the context of labor, immigration, and 




WKFN] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (stating that the FDA engages in several forms 
of regulatory harmonization).  
44 See Bull et. al. New Approaches, supra note 34 (summarizing and analyzing 
the eleven types of IRC mechanisms provided in two OECD papers).  
45 Id. at 8. 
46 Id. at 8 – 10. 
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legally binding instruments include OECD guidelines47 and princi-
ples, and Global Salmserv, an international organization of laborato-
ries and individuals involved in amplifying Salmonella prevention 
which, in 2009, changed its name  to the Global Foodborne Infections 
Network to better reflect the scope beyond Salmonella.48  
Standard-setting is the next step along the continuum and it 
begins with the adoption of private codes (technical standards49) 
by multinational private standards organizations.  Examples of 
private codes are GFSI50 and GlobalG.A.P.51  Countries participate 
in international standard setting by relying on private codes or 
through membership in international organizations.52  Despite the 
criticism of the use of international standards,53 standards are im-
                                                 
47 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/ 
[https://perma.cc/E7PG-94RW] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (providing links to 
different OECD guidelines). 
48 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, The Global Foodborne Infectious Network 
Key Activities, http://www.who.int/gfn/activities/en/ [https://perma.cc/928F-
6735] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (describing the major activities of the Global 
Foodborne Infections Network) [hereinafter WHO, Global Foodborne Network]. 
49 See ALAN O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED 
GOODS MARKETS at 2 (1995) (defining a product standard as “a specification or set 
of specifications that relates to some characteristic of a product or its manufac-
ture.”). 
50 See GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVE, What is GFSI, 
http://www.mygfsi.com/about-us/about-gfsi/what-is-gfsi.html 
[https://perma.cc/9UEJ-ZVUU] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (describing the Global 
Food Safety Initiative’s mission, objectives, and background). 
       51  See GLOBALG.A.P, GLOBALG.A.P. - Putting Food Safety and Sustainability on 
the Map, http://www.mygfsi.com/about-us/about-gfsi/what-is-gfsi.html 
[https://perma.cc/7PBZ-T6DT] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (providing infor-
mation about G.A.P and GlobalG.A.P.). 
52 See Eibe Riedel, Standards and Sources: Farewell to the Exclusivity of the 
Sources Triad in International Law?  2 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 58, 81 – 82 (1991) (showing 
that organizations set standards to harmonize transactions in fields such as envi-
ronmental law and human rights). 
53 See Alberto Alemanno & Giuseppe Capodieci, Testing the Limits of Global 
Food Governance: The Case of Ractopamine, 3 EUR. J. RISK REG. 400 (2012) (arguing 
that the use of the drug ractopamine will lead to trade disputes and the weaken-
ing of multilateral global food safety governance).  See also Kuei-Jung Ni, Does Sci-
ence Speak Clearly and Fairly in Trade and Food Safety Disputes? The Search for an Op-
timal Response to WTO Adjudication to Problematic International Standard-Making, 68 
FOOD & DRUG L. J. 97, 97 (2013) (stating that Codex standard setting may be undu-
ly influenced by trade interests); Alberto Alemanno, TRADE IN FOOD: REGULATORY 
AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES IN THE EU AND THE WTO 262 – 3 (2007) (“WTO members 
have incentives to make sure that the new standards of Codex, IPPC and OIE find 
inspiration in their current or future national SPS measures,” meaning that policy 
positions on standards are motivated by self-interest).  Also, Codex is incentivized 
16
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portant in food safety.  For example, standards  specify limits for 
pesticide residue levels on the skin of an apple, or for example, 
“methods for laboratory testing of beef or milk for artificial growth 
hormones (or natural components, such as fat content) so that food 
safety inspections and consumer labels provide reliable and com-
parable information.”54  Standards are also important because, 
when used to justify a trade measure, the WTO General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade raises a presumption that such measures are 
legitimate and not protectionist.55  An example of incorporation of 
private codes into national legislative instruments can be found in 
the United States Food Safety Modernization Act requirement that 
exporters conducting business with United States importers re-
ceive external audits from private entities.56  Another technique for 
fostering IRC along the continuum is transgovernmental network-
ing, known as cooperation among agencies or national govern-
ments based on frequent interaction without formal treaties.  The 
Global Foodborne Infections Network serves as an example.57 
Formal international agreements are next along the continuum 
and are a typical avenue for fostering IRC.  Mutual Recognition 
Agreements are treaties in which countries retain different national 
standards in national regulatory law, but agree to allow market ac-
cess upon approval by the other jurisdiction’s regulatory authority.  
Bilateral agreements for mutual recognition of national regulatory 
standards or conformity procedures and other forms of regulatory 
                                                                                                               
by the enforceability of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in such a way 
that Codex member states tend to vote in a manner what would advance their 
trade interests rather than promote food safety.  A country that has its standards 
adopted in the Codex will not have to defend its SPS measures in the WTO.  Such 
a presumption may tempt countries to make frequent use of majority voting at 
Codex meetings. 
54 See Tim Büthe & Walter Mattli, International Standards and Standard-Setting 
Bodies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 440, 440 (David 
Coen et. al. eds., 2010) (stating the importance of food safety standards).  
55 See WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, art. 3, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement] (establishing 
standards for food safety and sanitary measures for plants and animals); Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2.4, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 (establishing 
standards for regulation in order reduce barriers to trade).  
56 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FSMA Final Rule on Accredited Third-Party 
Certification, http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/
ucm361903.htm [https://perma.cc/GF2D-QNX3] (summarizing the rule on ac-
creditation for third-party certification bodies for food safety). 
57 See WHO, Global Foodborne Network, supra note 48 (describing the Global 
Foodborne Infections Network). 
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coordination are called regulatory equivalence determinations.58  
These types of agreements are common for certain foods.  Using 
poultry imports as an example, an import may proceed only if the 
country willing to export proves that its inspection system, guaran-
teeing the safety of final products, is equivalent to that of the Unit-
ed States with verification of the applicant’s inspection system per-
formed by the United States Department of Agriculture.59 
Next, international agreements are multilateral treaties that aim 
to reduce regulatory barriers to trade.  The WTO is an example of 
an international organization that makes countries transpose inter-
national trade obligations into domestic law through a multilateral 
treaty.60  The United States, for example, has free trade agreements 
in place with twenty nations,61 and other agreements which seek to 
harmonize economic relations.  A Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU), also known as a “Cooperative Arrangement,”62 is a formal 
agreement between the FDA and one or more foreign governments 
or international partners that describes the willingness and good-
faith intentions of FDA and its counterpart(s) to engage in coopera-
                                                 
58 See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition 
Regimes: Governance without Global Government, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 
264 (2005) [https://perma.cc/8JBG-93NV] (“Mutual recognition forms an essen-
tial part of any global administrative law”).  For recent case law on equivalence, 
see WTO, Standards Committee Discusses Tyres, Toy Safety and Food, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/tbt_10nov15_e.htm [https://
perma.cc/SX2J-HALF] (noting that “’equivalence’ refers to governments recogniz-
ing other countries’ measures as acceptable even if they are different from their 
own, so long as an equivalent level of protection is provided.”).  
59 See Panel Report, United States-Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry 
from China, ¶2.6, WTO Doc. WT/DS392/R (adopted Sept. 29, 2010), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/392r_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V5ST-TP6E] (The FSIS, an agency of the USDA, will determine permissibility of 
importation based on “whether an applicant’s poultry inspection system is equiv-
alent to that of the United States”).  
60 See JARROD WIENER, GLOBALIZATION AND THE HARMONIZATION OF LAW 35 
(1999) (noting that harmonization of regulation across borders sometimes occurs 
through adopting international agreements into domestic law). 
61 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Free Trade Agree-
ments, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last accessed 
Sept. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6EPR-G2EC] (listing free trade agreements with 
Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Nica-
ragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Singapore).  
62 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA Memoranda of Understanding, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUn
derstandingMOUs/default.htm [https://perma.cc/TP9Y-P568].  
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tive activities.63  The FDA enters into MOUs with other entities 
whenever there is a need to delineate authority or responsibility, or 
to explain cooperative procedures.  A Confidentiality Commitment 
is a precursor to the Cooperative Arrangement and it allows but 
does not require countries to share non-public information be-
tween governments.64  
Other agreements enable countries to share resources critical 
for food safety.  The current structure for international/regional 
foodborne disease surveillance, for example, includes both formal 
and informal relationships between and among countries.  Some 
examples include the Global Foodborne Infections Network and the 
European Commission Health and Consumer Protection weekly 
reports from the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF).65  
Regulatory agencies in the United States work closely with other 
countries to assist in developing the U.S. Foodborne Illness Surveil-
lance System (FoodNet) in other countries (such as OZFoodNet in 
Australia).66  Formal (or informal) coordination with the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organ-
ization (FAO) of the United Nations and other international and 
regional organizations regarding incidents involving intentional 
contamination is an integral part of strengthening national systems 
to respond to all food safety emergencies, including country partic-
ipation in the INFOSAN Emergency Network.67  
Finally, as countries move towards a single regulatory law, 
countries can promote regulatory cooperation by joining interna-
tional organizations, such as the Codex Alimetarius Commission 
                                                 
63 Id.  
64  A ‘Confidentiality Commitment’ is a document that must be in place for 
the FDA to share certain non-public information with FDA counterparts in foreign 
countries and international organizations as part of cooperative law enforcement 
or regulatory activities.  
65 See FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., Food Contamination Monitoring and Food-Borne 
Disease Surveillance at National Level, http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/
008/y5871e/y5871e0n.htm [https://perma.cc/F9DU-V8QG] (last visited Sept. 21, 
2016) (recommending the establishment of a coordinating body in order to moni-
tor food contamination and conduct foodborne disease surveillance) [hereinafter 
FAO, International Cooperation]. 
66 The U.S. agencies which are responsible for forming partnerships with oth-
er country regulators include: the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS/CDC), the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), as 
well as the HHS' Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
67 See FAO, International Cooperation, supra note 65 (describing the objectives 
of the INFOSAN). 
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(Codex), the international food standard-setting organization, and 
entering into formal regulatory partnerships, such as the US-
Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council.68  From there, countries 
can further harmonize through a supranational or joint regulator 
or through a formal agreement to adopt the same regulatory 
standard in each national regulation.  An example of this is the 
United States Food Safety Modernization Act as applied to the 
United Sates, or European Union Directives as applied to European 
Union-Member nations.  The final step before full cooperation is to 
enlist a joint regulator, or a single regulatory agency to promulgate 
joint regulations with standards covering two or more jurisdic-
tions.  An example of this is the Joint Food Standards Australia and 
New Zealand.69 
Among these techniques for food safety, international agree-
ments, mutual recognition agreements, and membership in inter-
national organizations are most popular, with the proliferation of 
private codes and joint regulation gaining momentum.  And yet, 
when harmonization of product standards is neither feasible nor 
economically viable for some,70 or when strong preferences of na-
tional standards preclude harmonization, recognition of equiva-
lence is an alternative to a specific area, time, degree and scope.71  
In this way, harmonization must be viewed in light of other com-
plementary alternatives discussed below, such as: standard-setting, 
transparency and monitoring, technical assistance, recognition and 
equivalence, economic integration, convergence of policy proce-
                                                 
68 For a description of the US-Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council, see 
UNITED STATES – CANADA REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL, JOINT FORWARD 
PLAN, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/us-
canada-rcc-joint-forward-plan.pdf (2014) [https://perma.cc/5ZS2-U74L] (last vis-
ited Sept. 21, 2016)  (describing various initiatives to improve regulatory coopera-
tion).  
69 Id. 
70 See Dunoff, Mapping a Hidden World, supra note 13 at 150 (noting that a 
complementary approach to harmonization is recognition of equivalence, given 
the substantial challenge that harmonization may be).   
71 See William A. Kerr & James D. Gaisford, HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE POLICY (2007), at 400; David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An 
Analysis of Harmonization Claims, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: 
PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 41, 91 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec, eds., 
1996) (arguing that “mutual recognition achieves most of the benefits of harmoni-
zation with few of its costs”).  See also TIM E. JOSLING, ET AL., FOOD REGULATION AND 
TRADE: TOWARD A SAFE AND OPEN GLOBAL SYSTEM 194 (Institute for International 
Economics 2004) (noting that “equivalence is an alternate to harmonization” that 
has some pros and cons). 
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dures, or regulatory mechanisms within international legal re-
gimes. 72   
 
2.2.  Food Safety Threats and Challenges 
 
Regulators are keenly aware of the various risks related to food 
imports that result from mislabeling, undeclared allergens, the use 
of banned additives, and food contamination.73  But as advances in 
food science and food production become more technologically 
complex, and as supply chains continue to grow, regulators need 
to minimize food safety risks74 related to new technologies and 
new country sources.  
A wide range of new technologies is emerging to meet various 
food production needs.  Some technologies make food resistant to 
disease, grow faster and more efficiently, produce less waste, or 
help produce novel products that benefit humans. Others make 
food more attractive (e.g. titanium dioxide in the case of Gobstop-
pers) or increase food safety.75  For example, the processing method 
of bathing poultry in antimicrobial baths (“pathogen reduction 
treatments”) commonly uses chlorine and lactic acid to reduce risk 
of Salmonella.  While chlorine baths are now common in the Unit-
ed States (and 120 countries) as a food safety measure to kill bacte-
                                                 
72 See CHRISTIAN STRUCK, PRODUCT REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS IN WTO LAW 
163 (2014); Dunoff, Mapping a Hidden World supra note 13 at 273 (arguing that 
global regulators lack many regulatory mechanisms that are common features of 
domestic regulators).  See also David W. Leebron, Mutual Recognition: Structure, 
Problems and Prospects, in REGULATORY REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
OPENNESS 205, 213 (1996) (noting that harmonization, standardization and recog-
nition of equivalence serve complementary functions). 
73 See Brunet Marks, The Risks, supra note 33 (referring to the import refusal 
dataset). 
74 For a list of risks, see FAO, International Cooperation, supra note 65 (listing 
risks such as soil degradation).  And, to be sure, the examples of nanofoods and 
genetically modified foods are stand-ins for a number food-related issues, tech-
nologies currently being tested and considered, such as growth hormones, food 
products from cloned animals, endocrine disrupting chemicals, antimicrobial re-
sistance to antibiotics, plant synthetic biology, and future food risks that public 
health and safety regulation may address.  
75 See Joanna Klein, Dolly the Sheep’s Fellow Clones, Enjoying Their Golden Years, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/science/dolly-
the-sheep-clones.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=second-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-
news&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QB43-5R8H] (noting that the European Union 
bans the sale and import of food from cloned animals). 
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ria, Europe has banned them since 1990 as a possible cancer risk 
(though Europe allows meat bathed in lactic acid).76   
As regulators try to develop an acceptable risk management 
strategy with respect to new technologies, IRC techniques provide 
regulators with a range of options.  International food standards, 
drafted by the Codex Commission, are frequently used to guide 
regulation.  In 2011, Codex established a standard for washing 
meat using chlorine or lactic acid.77  This new standard pressured 
the European Food Safety Association to consider adopting lactic 
acid as a washing agent.  The European approach (using lactic ac-
id) will not be identical to the approach in the United States (using 
chlorine), but the regulations will be equivalent in that they ac-
complish the same end result.  Here, an equivalence determination 
was the IRC technique used to resolve this regulatory difference. 
What happens in cases such as nanotechnology, where standards 
do not exist?  In this situation, different IRC techniques, starting 
with dialogue, can be used to encourage cooperation, and some 
agreements can foster IRC better than others.  
With new supply chains, often in new geographical areas, it 
can be particularly difficult to verify that new suppliers can pro-
vide the requisite regulatory framework and sufficiently robust 
public health measures to ensure the safety of the foods offered for 
international trade.78  Some food risks do not involve new technol-
ogies but can be traced to longstanding food safety problems, such 
as fish trade with Asia.  
Every year, consumers in the United States purchase two tril-
lion dollars’ worth of imported products from 825,000 importers 
                                                 
76 See Susanna Capelouto, European Activists Say They Don’t Want Any U.S. 
‘Chlorine Chicken’, NPR, Sept. 30, 2014 http://www.npr.org/sections/
thesalt/2014/09/30/351774240/european-activists-say-they-dont-want-any-u-s-
chlorine-chicken [https://perma.cc/3DTX-CCGX] (mentioning the ban upon 
chlorine treated chicken).  See also Laurence Peter, TTIP Talks: Food Fights Block EU-
US Trade Deal, BBC NEWS, June 10, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-33055665 [https://perma.cc/9845-Q3E7] (describing that the EFSA is con-
sidering whether to allow peroxyacetic acid as a poultry rinse). 
77 See CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION, Report of the Forty-Second Session of 
the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene, Appendix 3, ¶77, U.N. Doc. REP 11/FH, 
http://www.ift.org/public-policy-and-regulations/advocacy/~/media/Public%
20Policy/International%20Advocacy/Codex_CCFH.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSJ3-
ZE34] (stipulating the guidelines for washing carcasses to prevent salmonella and 
campylobacter in chicken meat). 
78 See generally Brunet Marks, The Risks, supra note 33 (discussing the chal-
lenges and shortcomings facing the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011, which 
updates regulatory means for fighting food safety risks). 
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through more than 300 ports of entry.  These numbers are rising79 
making food safety breaches inevitable.  The United States imports 
80% of its fish supply, largely from developing countries in Asia.  
United States Center for Disease Control (CDC) experts reviewed 
outbreaks from 2005-2010 for foods imported to the United States 
and found that during those years, 39 outbreaks and 2348 illnesses 
were linked to food imports from 15 countries.80  Nearly half (17 
outbreaks) occurred in 2009 and 2010 with 45% of the imported 
foods causing the outbreaks coming from Asia.81  Fish (17 out-
breaks) were the most common source of implicated imported 
foodborne disease, followed by spices (6 outbreaks).82  These 
longstanding food safety problems motivate regulators in different 
countries to work together to harmonize standards and regulatory 
requirements.  
For instance, for some time, United States consumers have 
complained about lax food safety standards in Vietnam and Ma-
laysia over catfish exports with traces of antibiotics.  As complaints 
heightened during the TPP negotiations83  the catfish inspections 
shifted to the USDA from the FDA.84  In the United States, food is 
                                                 
79 See Press Release, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
(HHS), HHS Preparing to Open FDA Offices in China, India, Europe and Latin 
America This Year (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm153679.htm [https://perma.cc/976P-
ELW7] (announcing the opening of several international FDA offices).  
80 See Press Release, US CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, CDC 
Research Shows Outbreak Linked to Imported Foods Increasing (Mar. 14, 2012), 
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2012/p0314_foodborne.html [https://
perma.cc/LZ8E-F3ZC] (stating that the increase in outbreaks is related to in-
creased food imports). 
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 See Dan Flynn, House Leaders Asked Not to Vote on Senate Resolution to End 
USDA Catfish Inspection, FOOD SAFETY NEWS, (May 31, 2016), http://
www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/05/house-might-not-vote-on-senate-maneuver-
to-end-usda-catfish-inspection/#.V42eSKJbjsA [https://perma.cc/VM5H-FWT4] 
(noting that United States Farm Bills going back to 2008 require catfish inspec-
tions).  See also Letter from Rosa L. DeLauro, supra note 1 (exemplifying com-
plaints as the TPP was being drafted). 
84 Dan Flynn, USDA Plans to Begin Catfish Inspections in March 2016, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS, (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/11/usdas-
domestic-and-foreign-catfish-inspections-will-begin-in-march-2016/
#.Vq47Y0ZRoio  [https://perma.cc/2SU2-YBB6] (stating that the USDA released 
a final rule shifting catfish inspections to the Agency from the FDA, under a spe-
cial program beginning in March, 2016, which will include equivalency determi-
nations and audits).  See also Press Release, US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 
USDA Releases Final Rule Establishing Inspection Programs for Siluriformes Fish, 
23
Marks: The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
  
24 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
mostly regulated by three agencies: the FDA, USDA and the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency.  There are problems that come with 
regulating in tandem,85 but also advantages– such as being able to 
fix food safety problems by shifting agency oversight.  Compared 
to the FDA, the USDA has more strict enforcement.86  While catfish 
inspection under the USDA may improve, agency shifts are not a 
long-term sustainable solution.87  This example shows that regula-
tory differences in enforcement of domestic food safety regulations 
(or lack thereof) can motivate more regulatory cooperation (from 
less stringent FDA oversight to more stringent USDA oversight).  
The following section shows how varying regulatory approaches, 
based on differences in  philosophy and culture, motivate greater 
IRC. 
   
2.3.  Competing Philosophical Approaches to Regulation  
 
Countries have the right to enact regulations to protect public 
health and safety and they do so, based on different perceptions of 
what constitutes a risk.  As Trebilcock and Soloway point out, “one 
nation’s bunch of grapes is another nation’s repository of carcino-
genic pesticide residue.”88  Regulatory differences can emerge from 
differences in constitutional and political structures,89 regulatory 
                                                                                                               
Including Catfish (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/
fsis/newsroom/news-releases-statements-transcripts/news-release-archives-by-
year/archive/2015/nr-112515-01 [https://perma.cc/YB5M-R6N9] (providing the 
final Catfish inspection rule). 
85 See Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 
UCLA L. REV. 665, 701 (1986) (noting the friction in foreign relations that results 
from conflicting national regulation) [hereinafter Trimble]. 
86 Border inspections will improve once the FDA Food Safety Modernization 
Act and the new import safety rules are implemented, but for the time being, low 
rates of FDA border inspections will continue to compromise the safety of food 
entering the United States. 
87 Additionally, the TPP rules do not necessitate the enforcement of domestic 
rules.  There is no enforcement mechanism for domestic inspections.  
88 See Michael Trebilcock & Julie Soloway, International. Policy and Domestic 
Food Safety Regulation: The Case for Substantial Deference by the WTO Settlement Body 
under the SPS Agreement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE at 1 
(Daniel L. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002). 
89 See Richard Parker & Alberto Alemanno, Towards Effective Regulatory Coop-
eration under TTIP: A Comparative Overview of the EU and US Legislative and Regula-
tory Systems, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152466.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT8P-UYUX] 
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divergences, disparate risk assessments and tolerances, political 
considerations,90 historical values, and cultural norms.91  Regulato-
ry differences can also develop when harmonization presents re-
markable practical and political challenges.92   
  Two regulatory paradigms have come to dominate interna-
tional debates and disputes over health and environmental risk – 
one based on ‘sound science’, or the ‘reasonable certainty of no 
harm’ standard, and one based on the ‘precautionary principle’.93  
While both regulatory approaches are science-based in that scien-
tific evidence is the point for assessments of risk, they diverge on 
the way scientific evidence is evaluated given different sensitivities 
to uncertainties and levels of emphasis placed on social and eco-
nomic matters.94  
The United States’ notion of ‘sound science’ emphasizes that 
protective actions should be used only when there is sound scien-
tific evidence of risk.95  Evidence is limited to that ‘gathered 
through scientific methods’ with the result that only ‘a complete, 
self-contained, scientific evaluation’ will be considered an ade-
quate risk assessment.96  Meanwhile, the ‘precautionary principle’, 
                                                                                                               
(showing that U.S., regulatory programs are relatively highly centralized in the 
federal government with administrative agencies playing a major role in decision 
making; while in Europe, regulatory authority is shared between the EU and 
member states). 
90 See Bull, supra note 34 (offering a detailed view of the four causes of regula-
tory differences).  
91 See DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES at 162 – 64 (2007) (explaining why the Euro-
pean Union agreed to the SPS). 
92 See Ravichandran, supra note 5, at 77 – 83 (providing an example of how 
the precautionary principle may take too long compared to equivalence, but 
equivalence is more politically feasible).   
93 World HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: PROTECTING 
PUBLIC HEALTH, THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE OF OUR CHILDREN at 94 (Marco 
Martuzzi and Joel A. Tickner, eds. 2004) [hereinafter WHO, THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE]. 
94 Id. at 169. 
95 See Mills v. Grant of Md. L.L.C., 441 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.C. 2006) (aff’d 508 
F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing 21 C.F.R. 170 (3i)) (“the FDA has defined ‘safety’ to 
mean that there is a reasonable certainty in the minds of competent scientists that 
the substance is not harmful under the intended conditions of use”). 
96 See Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, 8.92, 
WTO Doc. WT/SD245/R (adopted July 15, 2003), https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds245_e.htm [https://perma.cc/SZ97-5RXH] (provid-
ing an example in Japan’s restrictions on American apple exports).  See also Panel 
Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Bio-
tech Products, 7/3188. WTO Doc. WT/DS/291/R; WT/DS292/R; WT/DS293/R, 
25
Marks: The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
  
26 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
articulated in the 1960s, and widely adopted today, generally ad-
vocates for regulating when faced with scientific uncertainty about 
risk to human health and the environment.97  This principle 
acknowledges that scientific understanding is limited and precau-
tionary action can serve underlying values based on what is known 
as well as what is not known.98  It encourages close scrutiny of all 
aspects of science, from the research agenda to the funding, design, 
interpretation and limits of studies, and involves recognizing that 
the answer science gives to questions of safety and risk typically 
depends on the specific question asked, how it is framed, and the 
underlying assumptions.99  In practice then, the question becomes 
whether there is flexibility, where issues of scientific uncertainty 
arise, to embrace broader forms of risk assessment that blend scien-
tific findings, anecdotal information, and value concerns.100  Ulti-
mately, a food producer has to demonstrate that a food product is 
safe: when there are credible threats of harm, precautionary action 
should be taken, even absent full understanding of the effects of a 
proposed activity.  
While the precautionary principle has application in other 
countries,101 the European Union102 has become a strong proponent 
                                                                                                               
(adopted Sept. 29, 2006), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds291_e.htm [https://perma.cc/VJ5V-TM6Y] (resolving a dispute over 
biotechnology products imported into the EC from the United States). 
97 See WHO, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 93, at 7 (“in cases of 
serious or irreversible threats to the health of humans or ecosystems, acknowl-
edged scientific uncertainty should not be used as a reason to postpone preven-
tive measures”). 
98 Id. (noting that the precautionary principle carries its own values.  The 
principle is based on recognizing that people have a responsibility to prevent 
harm and to preserve the natural foundations of life, now and into the future.  The 
needs of future generations of people and other species and the integrity of eco-
systems are recognized as being worthy of care and respect.  A precautionary ap-
proach asks how much harm can be avoided rather than asking how much is ac-
ceptable.  It acknowledges that the world comprises complex, interrelated systems 
that are vulnerable to harm from human activities and resistant to full under-
standing.  Precaution gives priority to protecting these vulnerable systems and 
requires gratitude, empathy, restraint, humility, respect, and compassion).  
99 Id. at 194. 
100 Id.  
101 The precautionary principle is said to originate in Germany, however, 
other countries including the U.S. also have a long history of reliance on precau-
tionary approaches to regulation.  The United States led with precautionary envi-
ronmental policies in the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s.  By the 1990s, the roles had re-
versed, and it was the U.S. government that resisted precautionary-based controls 
in areas such as climate change, whereas the EU surged ahead.  See Jonathan B. 
Weiner, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of 
26
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of precautionary regulation in a range of health and environmental 
areas.103  Beginning with regulatory failures and ‘crises’ that took 
place in Europe in the late 1980s (concerning nuclear and chemical 
accidents) and the latter half of the 1990s (involving food safety 
and health protection – most prominent of which was mad cow 
disease, which severely undermined public trust in European Un-
ion food safety regulations and the scientific expertise on which 
they were based),104 European regulatory policies began to em-
brace a more stringent approach compared to American regulatory 
policies.105  In the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the European Union 
expressly provided that the European Union policy on the envi-
ronment “shall be based on the precautionary principle”.106  De-
spite its environmental origins in the European Community Trea-
ty, the precautionary principle has shown that it has application in 
                                                                                                               
Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L. L. 207 (2003) (comparing US and 
EU regulations generally).  See also WHO, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra 
note 93, at 42 (providing an in-depth discussion of the principle).   
102 Alberto Alemanno, The Shaping of European Risk Regulation by Community 
Courts (Jean Monnet Working Paper 18/08, 2008), http://
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/08/081801.html [https://perma.cc/U5E4-
WCBF]. 
103 Most notably in climate change, biotechnology, and chemicals regulation.  
By contrast, it was the USA throughout the 1970s and 1980s that pushed most 
strongly for precautionary international environmental agreements for endan-
gered species protection and the regulation of ozone-depleting substances.  
104 See Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 34, at 169 (noting the discussion on 
delegation of authority to regulatory agencies).  See also David Vogel, The Politics 
of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States, in 3 THE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1, 2 – 3, 24 – 34 (H. Somsen et al. eds., 2003) (cataloguing 
various regulatory failures over the course of the 1980s and 1990s in Europe); 
Wiener, infra 106, at 227 (indicating nations that generally take a more ‘precau-
tionary’ approach than the U.S. in the nuclear power area, because the U.S. expe-
rienced the Three Mile Island disaster, while the EU did not have any equivalent 
meltdown in the EU).  
105 David Vogel, The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consum-
er and Environmental Regulation in Europe, 33 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 557, 571 – 73 (2003). 
106 Jonathan B. Wiener, The Rhetoric of Precaution, in THE REALITY OF 
PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, 
(Jonathan B. Wiener et al. eds., 2011) (noting that the Treaty on European Union, 
Official Journal C 191, 29 July 1992 entered into force 1 Nov. 1993.  This treaty 
changed the name of the former European Economic Community to simply the 
‘European Community’ and added new provisions to the Community’s constitu-
tive treaty document.  The new provisions included Article 130r concerning the 
role of the precautionary principle in Community environmental policy).  See also, 
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, 1997, O.J. (C 340) (en-
tered into force May 1, 1999) (enacting the precautionary principle in Article 
174(2) of the EC Treaty). 
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other areas, for instance, to protect human health and plant 
health.107 
Philosophical differences can become a source of contention 
when national regulatory approaches come into conflict at the in-
ternational level.108  In the late 1990s, precaution began to emerge 
as the focus of dispute between the European Union, the United 
States, and other large trading blocs.109  Two examples illustrate 
how these two paradigms differ with respect to regulating new 
food technologies (and where cooperation is needed).  
The first example uses Gobstoppers to compare how the Europe-
an Union and the United States regulate nanotechnology.  As not-
ed earlier, Gobstoppers contain titanium dioxide, a nanoparticle and 
food additive, used to brighten color. The European Union re-
quires labeling ingredients derived from nanotechnology110, while 
the United States does not. In the United States, the FDA regulates 
food products and not food technologies so no special regulations 
exist for the use or labeling of nanotechnology in the food indus-
try.111  As a food additive, titanium dioxide requires FDA approval 
through a petition process that assures that the additive is safe for 
its intended use.112  To date, food ingredients and food products 
                                                 
107 Id. at 52 (citing the European Commission communication on precaution). 
108 See Trimble supra note 85.  There are other problems as countries treat na-
tions as working under one regulatory entity when this is not often the case.  
Trimble notes the friction in foreign relations that results from conflicting national 
regulation – which is the case for food safety as it is regulated by several federal 
agencies.  
109 See WHO, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 93, at 51 (noting that 
in the 1990s, the EU cited the precautionary principle to justify trade restrictions 
on the import of United States beef treated with hormones and of genetically 
modified food material, reasoning that the science was not sufficiently robust.  
The U.S., meanwhile, claimed that the principle was an unjustified trade barrier). 
110 See Exec. Order No. 13,609, supra note 20 (noting that the European Union 
has recommended special regulations that have yet to be accepted and enforced.  
Also noting that the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering rec-
ommend indicating nanoparticles in the lists of ingredients). 
111 See Nanotechnology, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (last up-
dated Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/
Nanotechnology/default.htm [https://perma.cc/MXW9-Y9LQ] (noting that the 
FDA says that it regulates “products, not technologies.”  In the United States, the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires manufacturers to demonstrate 
that the food ingredients and food products are not harmful to health, yet this 
regulation does not “specifically” cover nanoparticles, which could become harm-
ful only in nano-sized applications.  Thus no special regulations exist for the use 
of nanotechnology in the food industry). 
112 See Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers about the Petition Process, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (last updated July 1, 2016), 
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are not harmful to health113 yet the approval of titanium dioxide as 
an additive did not specifically cover nanoparticle properties or 
potential risks.   
Another example uses AquAdvantage Salmon,114 a genetically 
modified salmon developed in the United States, to compare how 
the European Union and the United States regulate genetically 
modified food.  The United States ‘sound science’ approach re-
quires the FDA to show that the genetically modified food is as 
safe as its non-genetically modified counterpart.115  In 2016, the 
FDA determined that food from AquAdvantage Salmon is as safe to 
eat as food from non-genetically modified Atlantic salmon and, 
since there is no “material difference” between the genetically 
modified Atlantic salmon and the non-genetically modified Atlan-
tic salmon, there is no obligation to label the product as genetically 
modified (although the FDA will issue guidance to companies on 
how to label products voluntarily).116  Yet, despite FDA approval, 
                                                                                                               
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocuments
RegulatoryInformation/IngredientsAdditivesGRASPackaging/ucm253328.htm 
[https://perma.cc/THK5-K6AH] (providing guidance on the petition process re-
lated to food additives). 
113 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Summary of Color Additives for Use 
in the United States in Foods, Drugs, Cosmetics, and Medical Devices (last updated 
Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/ColorAdditives/
ColorAdditiveInventories/ucm115641.htm [https://perma.cc/ERM8-2HTB] (list-
ing food additives). 
114 Andrew Pollack, Genetically Engineered Salmon Approved for Consumption, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/business/
genetically-engineered-salmon-approved-for-consumption.html [https://
perma.cc/7ZGH-2NDU] (noting that an Atlantic salmon contains a growth hor-
mone gene from a Chinook salmon and a fragment of ocean pout DNA that acts 
as a sort of perpetual “on” switch—a  combination that helps the salmon grow 
large enough for consumption in 18 months instead of the typical three years). 
115 As part of its evaluation, the FDA examined data comparing three groups 
of fish: non-GE farm-raised Atlantic salmon from both the sponsor’s farm and 
from a different commercial farm, and AquAdvantage Salmon.  This study com-
pared key hormones (including estradiol, testosterone, 11-ketotestosterone, T3, T4 
and insulin-like growth factor 1) and found no biologically relevant differences.  
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AquAdvantage Salmon Fact Sheet (last up-
dated Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/Development
ApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/
ucm473238.htm [https://perma.cc/7ZGH-2NDU] (summarizing features of 
AquAdvantage Salmon). 
116 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AquAdantage Salmon (last updated 
on Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEngineered
Animals/ucm280853.htm [https://perma.cc/72RE-ZPHN] (listing documents re-
lated to the AquAdvantage Salmon approval). 
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within the United States, certain states and counties have passed 
bills which require labeling for foods containing genetically modi-
fied organisms.117   
The precautionary principle is now most prominent in Europe-
an Union law relating to food safety (as seen in the regulation of 
genetically modified organisms or ‘GMOs’).118  The European Un-
ion approach requires genetically modified food to undergo a strict 
approval process for import or sale– so strict that only one genet-
ically modified crop has been approved to date.119  Genetically 
modified crops require pre-approval prior to their release , as per 
the 2001 European Union GMO Directive on the deliberate release 
into the environment of genetically modified organisms, one of the 
few European Union environmental risk instruments to be explicit-
ly based on the precautionary principle.120  In 2015 the rules 
changed and thus European Union members can now ban cultiva-
tion of genetically modified crops on their territory,121 and ‘opt out’ 
imports of genetically engineered food and feed,122 even when the 
                                                 
117 See State Labeling Initiatives, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY (2016), 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues/976/ge-food-labeling/state-
labeling-initiatives# [https://perma.cc/U85B-EVFB] (describing state-level GMO 
labeling initiatives). 
118 See Bull, supra note 34, at 135 (noting the trend toward regulatory harmo-
nization). 
119 Ned Stafford, New E.U. Law Lets Nations Ban Gene-Modified Crops, 
CHEMISTRY WORLD (Jan. 19, 2015), reprinted in SCI. AM. (2016), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/new-e-u-law-lets-nations-ban-gene-
modified-crops/ [https://perma.cc/58WR-Y8NA] (noting the insect resistant 
maize MON810 is the only GM crop cultivated in the EU, grown mainly in Spain 
and Portugal.  Since MON810 was approved for EU cultivation in 1998, no addi-
tional GM grains have won approval, with MON810 cultivation banned in Ger-
many, France, Italy, and other nations, undermining the concept of a single Euro-
pean market). 
120 See generally Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Ge-
netically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001 
O.J. (L 106).  See also, The EU Regulatory System for GMOs, in UNCERTAIN RISKS 
REGULATED 269 (Michelle Everson & Ellen Vos eds., Abingdon: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2009) (providing a detailed discussion of Directive 2001/18/EC). 
121 See Eight Things You Should Know about GMOs, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
NEWS, (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20151013STO97392/Eight-things-you-should-know-about-GMOs 
[https://perma.cc/9XN4-MXLS] (stating that under the law, EU nations will be 
allowed to ban GMOs on the grounds of environmental policy, town and country 
planning, socio-economic impact, avoiding the unintended presence of GMOs in 
other products, and on farm policy objectives). 
122 See Press Release, Office of the US Trade Representative, USTR Expresses 
Concern over EU Proposal to Allow Member States to Ban the Use of GE Food 
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science-based safety and environmental determinations made by 
the European Union allow the importation and sale of genetically 
modified crops. 123  
As the two regulatory approaches are debated, other countries 
look on with interest.  In the 1980s and 1990s, interest in the pre-
cautionary principle rapidly spread well beyond Europe.124  To fur-
ther economic trade, developing countries have had to align with 
one of the competing regulatory schemes125 with African nations 
aligning with the precautionary principle, presumably due to his-
torical ties with Europe.  Other factors outside of trade relations 
help spread the precautionary principle. 
Over the last few decades the precautionary principle has be-
come an established element not only of international environmen-
tal law, but also the domestic environmental law of a number of 
countries such as Australia, Canada,126 and India.  Recently, Japan 
used the precautionary principle to justify a trade measure which 
restricted apple imports from the United States in order to prevent 
the introduction of the ‘fire blight’ plant disease (which affects 
plants but has no human health consequence).127  In Japan-Apples, 
the United States challenged Japan’s measures in the WTO and Ja-
pan defended the restrictions as ‘precautionary’, arguing for defer-
ence to Japanese national authorities in their interpretation of the 
scientific evidence.128  The WTO found the measure violated the 
                                                                                                               
and Food Deemed Safe by EU (Apr. 22, 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/april/ustr-expresses-concern-over-eu 
[https://perma.cc/XG6B-WZGF] (expressing concern about a movement toward 
regulatory disharmony). 
123 Eight Things You Should Know About GMOs, supra note 121. 
124 See WHO, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 93, at 46 (noting the 
widespread agreement on the precautionary principle). 
125 See e.g. Morris, supra note 4 (noting that this is true of products that both 
do or do not contain GMOs). 
126 Precautionary Principles: Government Positions - Canada, Sci. & Envtl. 
Health Network, http://www.sehn.org/canada.htmlvv [https://perma.cc/ED74-
LFQ6] (”’More than 70 municipalities (including Vancouver, British Columbia; 
Montreal, Quebec; and Halifax, Nova Scotia) have already passed bylaws prohib-
iting the cosmetic use of pesticides, and many more cities are poised to pass bans 
now that the Supreme Court has cleared the way.’ Early bans cited the precau-
tionary principle”). 
127 Panel Report, World Trade Organization, Japan-Measures Affecting the 
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SPS Agreement because it lacked scientific support129 and was “a 
disguised restriction on international trade”.130  Japan-Apples – 
while dealing with plant health and not human health – illustrates 
that the WTO dispute settlement decisions have narrowly inter-
preted the SPS Agreement to allow for standards set by scientific 
evidence (against the precautionary principle).  Such a narrow per-
spective could potentially reverse a ban on the importation of 
AquAdvantage Salmon in Europe.131  
And yet, while over the last few decades the precautionary 
principle has become an established element in the domestic law of 
certain countries, some argue that countries oscillate between ap-
proaches to regulation based on the target of regulation.  Notwith-
standing common perceptions concerning greater desire for the 
precautionary principle in Europe, the reality is that United States 
regulations are more precautionary than their European counter-
parts in some areas and less so in other areas (e.g. limitations on 
carbon emissions are stricter in Europe),132 while in some areas, the 
level of precaution is nearly equivalent (e.g. auto safety standards).  
This has implications on regulatory convergence— where one side 
is significantly more precautionary than the other, the likelihood of 
regulatory convergence is limited.133  The following sections draw 
upon trade disputes (emerging from philosophical differences or 
otherwise) to motivate the need for more international regulatory 
                                                 
129 Id.  
130 See WTO SPS Agreement, Article 5.5 (and by association Article 2.3), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QVU7-3AS2] (“each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifi-
able distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, 
if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade”). 
131 See e.g. Steve Connor, Genetically Modified Salmon Becomes First to be Ap-
proved for Human Consumption – But it Won’t Have to be Labelled as GM, The Inde-
pendent (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
science/genetically-modified-salmon-becomes-first-to-be-approved-for-human-
consumption-but-it-wont-have-to-a6741031.html [https://perma.cc/8UDC-
PQZY] (“’There remain legitimate ecological concerns over the possible conse-
quences if GM salmon escape to the wild and reproduce, despite FDA assurances 
over containment and sterility, neither of which can be guaranteed,’ said Joe Per-
ry, former chair the GM panel of the European Food Safety Authority.”) 
132 Reeve Bull, Answering TTIP’s Critics: Regulatory Cooperation in Risk Assess-
ment and Risk Management (Dec. 2, 2016), https://
regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/answering-ttips-critics-regulatory-
cooperation-risk-assessment-and-risk-management [https://perma.cc/FGB9-
GTWB] [hereinafter Bull, Answering]. 
133 Id.  
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cooperation. 
 
2.4.  Regulatory ‘Collisions’ 
 
This section makes the case for more international regulatory 
cooperation using examples of related to food safety.  Japan-Apples 
is an example of a regulatory ‘collision’– a historical moment 
where countries have sought to reduce regulatory differences 
through a formal trade dispute under the WTO dispute settlement 
system.   
Before discussing other disputes and as an introduction to the 
WTO framework, nations have long understood that membership 
in the world trade order signals a willingness to prioritize trade 
gains and harmonization over sovereignty.134  The Original GATT 
agreement of 1947, and the subsequent GATT agreement of 1994, 
provide countries with autonomy to establish food regulations, 
within limits.  Members have a right to enact domestic regula-
tions135 (even if enacted at the sub-national level), that are based on 
science, international standards, and are not more trade restrictive 
than necessary.  Members also have a duty to notify the Sanitary 
(animal life) and Phytosanitary (plant life) (together, “SPS”) Com-
mittee136 of all new regulations that pertain to human and animal 
plant life and health, and all modifications to existing regulations 
that do not conform to international standards and produce a sig-
nificant effect on international trade.137  Examples include prohibi-
                                                 
134 Tracey Epps, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HEALTH PROTECTION: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT OF THE WTO’S SPS AGREEMENT (Edward Elgar ed. 2008); see also Susy 
Frankel, The Legitimacy and Purpose of Intellectual Property Chapters in FTAs, in 
CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND 
REGIONAL AGREEMENTS, (Ross Buckley, Vai lo Lo, & Laurence Boulle eds., 2008) 
185 – 200.   
135 The SPS Agreement uses the terms “measures” and “regulations” some-
what interchangeably.  Regardless of the term used, the Agreement is referring to 
any sanitary or phytosanitary measure such as laws, decrees, or ordinances ap-
plied to protection human, animal or plant life or health as defined under para-
graph 1 of Annex A to the SPS Agreement. 
136 See The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary Measures, supra 55, at art. 7 (stating that the Committee meets 3 times per 
year and all 160 WTO members, acceding countries and observers, have the right 
to attend its meetings). 
137 See World Trade Organization, Recommended Transparency Procedures 
(Dec. 1, 2008), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/notification_
formats_e.htm [https://perma.cc/A9K8-AR6X] (providing recommendations to 
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tions on the sale of an imported product on health grounds, and 
positive requirements for imported products (ex. Certification re-
quirements).138  
Using Japan-Apples as an example, a WTO claim begins with a 
sixty-day consultation period between parties139 after which, if 
necessary, a Panel is established to hear the dispute. The Panel de-
livers a decision, which can be accepted by the opposing party or 
sent to the Appellate Body on appeal.  A claim is grounded on the 
GATT Agreements—most commonly the SPS Agreement (covering 
measures which influence domestic food safety and quality, and 
animal and plant health regulations),140 and the TBT Agreement 
(covering measures which affect other technical requirements such 
as certification, labeling and standardization that apply to agricul-
tural products both domestically and in international trade)141.  A 
regulation that restricts international trade may qualify for an ex-
ception: GATT Article XX allows governments to enact measures 
in order to protect human, animal or plant life or health, provided 
they do not discriminate or use this as disguised protectionism.142 
                                                                                                               
ensure regulatory transparency). 
138  Sykes, supra 49.   
139  See Dispute Settlement: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Govern-
ing the Settlement of Disputes art. 4.7, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter 
DSU] (stating that a complaining party may request for a panel to be established 
within sixty days upon failure of consultation to settle a dispute). 
140 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
art. 5.5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organ-
ization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (and by association Article 2.3) [hereinafter 
SPS]. An example of an SPS claim argues that importing countries are not adher-
ing to international standards and that parties experience long delays in complet-
ing risk assessments. 
141 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 1.3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marra-
kesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1886 
U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT].  For a recent WTO TBT case, see Technical Barriers 
to Trade Standard Committee, Standards Committee Discusses Tyres, Toy Safety 
and Food, World Trade Organization (Nov. 6, 2015), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/tbt_10nov15_e.htm [https://
perma.cc/YHC2-C5KS] (“[When India decided] to limit the entry of apples to the 
port of Nhava Sheva, some delegations argued that this would increase delays 
and create additional costs for producers and exporters. India stated that this 
measure was neither a technical regulation, standard nor conformity assessment 
procedure, and therefore did not fall within the scope of application of the TBT 
Agreement.”). 
142 Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade states: 
“[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
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A total of 502 cases have been brought to the WTO since 
1996;143 roughly one quarter of these144 (94 cases) implicated food 
and were brought under the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agree-
ment which can at times involve food products. Forty–three cases 
(9% of the total) cited the SPS agreement in their requests for con-
sultations145, and fifty–one cases (10% of the total) cited the TBT in 
their requests for consultations.146  Since the start of the WTO, there 
have been twelve SPS disputes leading to Panels.147  Refer to the 
                                                                                                               
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . . (b) necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health[.]”  General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, art XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].  
143 Current Status of Disputes, World Trade Organization, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8NBZ-XUMK] (last visited 9/12/2016).  See also Ambassador 
Demetrios Marantis, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep.  2013 Report on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, (2013), www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
2013%20SPS.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVJ6-FSZT] (stating from 2002–12, over 250 
SPS disputes were raised under the WTO’s dispute settlement system). 
144 Statistics, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/stats_e.htm   [https://perma.cc/G8RB-2J25] (last visited Sept. 
12, 2016) (exhibiting that 129 went to a WTO Panel).  
145 Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.ht
m?id=A19# [https://perma.cc/K62R-MDTS] (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
146 Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A2
2# [https://perma.cc/V67S-RG7B] (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
147 Alberto Alemano, The Multilateral Governance Framework for Food Safety: A 
Critical and Normative Overview, 9-45, in FOOD SAFETY, MARKET ORGANIZATION, 
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 20 (Abdelhakim Hammoudi et al. eds., Springer Pub-
lishers: New York 2015).  See e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/R/USA 
(Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter EC—Hormones] (detailing a dispute between the U.S. 
and the EC); Panel Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS18/R (June, 12 2000) [hereinafter Japan—Salmon] (explaining a 
dispute between Canada and Australia); Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting 
Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/R (Oct. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Japan—
Measures Agricultural Product II] (stating a dispute between the U.S. and Japan); 
Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WTO Doc. WT/DS245/R (June 
15, 2003) [hereinafter Japan—Apples] (detailing a dispute between the U.S. and 
Japan); Summary of Disputes, Australia—Certain Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables, WTO Doc. WT/DS270/RW (Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Australia— Fresh Fruit and Vegetable] (stating a dispute between Philippines 
and Australia); Notification of Mutually Agreed Resolution, Australia—Quarantine 
Regime for Imports, WTO Doc.  WT/DS287/RW (March 9, 2007) [hereinafter Aus-
tralia—Quarantine] (terminating a dispute between the EC and Australia); Panel 
Report: European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS291,292, 293/INTERIM (Sept. 29, 2006) [here-
inafter EC—Biotech] (stating that the EC violated WTO rules when it imposed a 
35
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Appendix for a list. 
First, what has emerged from the SPS jurisprudence is a com-
plex set of rulings on questions of sufficient scientific evidence and 
appropriate risk assessment that constrain the regulatory autono-
my of WTO members in the SPS field.148  The trend is to interpret 
SPS decisions through a narrow lens that “elevates the policing of 
trade restrictive measures above the ability of national govern-
ments to address risk in the face of scientific uncertainty.”149 
Among the twelve regulatory collisions listed above, EC-Biotech 
is an example of a regulatory collision evolving from philosophical 
differences.  This case involved complaints by the U.S., Canada and 
Argentina concerning European Community measures (a morato-
rium on the approval and marketing of biotech products), which 
allegedly violated the SPS Agreement. 
Since the WTO rules state that trade measures must be based 
on international standards, if international standards exist, they 
will be used.  In the EC-Biotech decision, the WTO Panel cited the 
Codex principles and guidelines on the safety of foods derived 
from genetically-modified  plants, animals and microorganisms.150  
                                                                                                               
moratorium on the approval of biotech products); Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute, WTO Doc.  
WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter US—Suspension] (indicating that 
the U.S. violated WTO rules by failing to remove retaliatory measures against the 
EC); Summary of Dispute, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Apples from 
New Zealand, WTO Doc. WT/DS367 (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Australia—
Apples] (detailing a dispute between New Zealand and Australia); Summary of 
Dispute, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling Requirements, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS384/8 (June 29, 2012) [hereinafter US-COOL (Canada)] (stating a labeling 
dispute between Canada and the U.S.);  Summary of Dispute, United States Certain 
Country of Origin Labelling Requirements (WTO Doc. WT/DS386/7 (Dec. 21, 
2015)[hereinafter US-COOL (Mexico)] (stating a labelling dispute between Mexico 
and the U.S.);  Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Apples from New Zealand, WTO Doc. WT/DS367/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2010) (detail-
ing a dispute between New Zealand and Australia on the importation of apples); 
Panel Report, United States—Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from Chi-
na, WTO Doc. WT/DS392/R (Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter U.S—Poultry] (stating a 
dispute between China and the U.S.); Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting the 
Import of Bovine Meat and Meat Products from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS391/R (Ju-
ly 3, 2012) [hereinafter Korea—Bovine Meat (Canada)] (stating a dispute between 
Canada and Korea).  
148 See Mann, supra note 35, at 263.  
149 See Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence 
Requirements: A Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 368 (2002). 
150 See Summary of Dispute, European Communities—Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,WTO Doc. WT/DS 291,292, 
293/INTERIM [hereinafter EC—Biotech] (summarizing disputes between the U.S. 
and EC, between Canada and EC and Argentina and EC).  
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The United States won EC-Biotech but suspended the retaliatory 
proceedings in the WTO in order to provide the European Union 
with “an opportunity to demonstrate meaningful progress in the 
approval of biotech products.”151  This shows that a government 
that chooses to build a regulatory mechanism addressing the food 
safety of genetically-modified foods can use Codex text as the base-
line, with each government adopting its own GMOs policy.152  
However, given that there are no internationally agreed-upon 
standards on the labeling of genetically modified foods, countries 
are free to apply their own labeling regulations. 
Next, the TBT jurisprudence also demonstrates examples of 
regulatory collisions regarding labeling, though not necessarily 
based upon philosophical differences.  Generally speaking, TBT ju-
risprudence153 has focused on whether a food label amounts to a 
trade restriction by balancing the discriminatory impacts a label 
                                                 
151 Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on the EC—Biotech 
Dispute (Jan. 2008), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/archives/2008/january/statement-ec-biotech-dispute 
[https://perma.cc/7QF3-33DV]. 
152 FAQs—Question about Specific Codex Work, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, 
http://www.codexalimentarius.org/faqs/specific-codex-work/en/ (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2016) [https://perma.cc/XE44-AJAA] [hereinafter FAQ, Codex] (“Codex 
has adopted principles and guidelines to assess food safety of foods derived from 
recombinant-DNA plants, animals and microorganisms.”). 
A government that chooses to build a regulatory mechanism addressing the food 
safety of GM foods can use Codex text as a basis, but each government is free to 
adopt its own policy as to the use of GM organisms in the agriculture and other 
sectors. At the moment, there are no internationally agreed-upon recommenda-
tions on the food labeling of GM foods. Governments are therefore applying their 
own regulations. 
153 See e.g., EC—Biotech, supra note 150 (holding that the regulations at bar 
are not impermissibly restrictive of trade or discriminatory because they are based 
on legitimate concerns). Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Produc-
tion and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2 2011)  [hereinaf-
ter US—Clove Cigarettes] (analyzing whether the U.S. ban on clove cigarettes was 
inconsistent, discriminatory, and necessary to achieve the end of reducing youth 
smoking.); US-COOL (Canada), supra note 147 (analyzing whether the country of 
origin labeling requirements under U.S. law give less favourable treatment to for-
eign goods, namely imported livestock products); Panel Report, United States—
Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter US—Tuna] (analyzing 
whether the “dolphin-safe labeling standards” discriminated against Mexican tu-
na products, and whether the regulations were necessary); Appellate Body Re-
port, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter US—Tuna II 
Appeal] (analyzing whether the “dolphin-safe labeling standards” discriminated 
against Mexican tuna products, and whether the regulations were necessary). 
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may have on imports against the legitimate purpose of the label it-
self.  Several WTO cases that implicate the TBT Agreement have 
involved whether the state has managed the use of the label; 
whether the label conforms to international standards; and wheth-
er the application of the labeling standard discriminates between 
imports and like domestic products.154   
Perhaps you have seen a package with the label, “dolphin safe.” 
This label was the focus of a recent WTO challenge wherein the 
TBT Agreement was successfully invoked to overturn a federal 
U.S. food labeling standard on tuna. This case, U.S-Tuna,  involved 
a regulatory collision – between the U.S. and its desire to regulate 
fishing practices (the  use of fishing nets that are dangerous to dol-
phins) through a mandatory food labeling standard (“dolphin 
safe”), and Mexico’s fishing practices.155  Mexico challenged these 
rules under the TBT agreement,156 making three leading claims: 
that United States dolphin-safe labelling provisions discriminate 
against Mexican tuna products, that the United States dolphin-safe 
labelling provisions are more trade-restrictive than necessary to 
fulfill the legitimate objectives, and lastly, that United States dol-
phin-safe labelling provisions violate the requirement that regula-
tions be based on relevant international standards where possi-
ble.157  In the end, a WTO panel struck down the labeling statute.  
In another high-profile case, the United States lost a WTO chal-
lenge and was asked to weaken domestic regulations to comply 
with a ruling on the Country of Origin Labeling Rule.158 
                                                 
154 Elizabeth Trujillo, Draft, New Visions for International Trade and Sustainable 
Development (Nov. 2015).  
155  US—Tuna, supra note 153; US-Tuna II Appeal, supra note 153.  
156  See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1868 
U.N.T.S. 120 (establishing standards for regulation in order reduce barriers to 
trade).  
157 US—Tuna, supra note 153. 
158 The COOL rule requires retail food stores to inform consumers about the 
country of origin of fresh fruits and vegetables, fish, shellfish, peanuts, pecans, 
macadamia nuts, ginseng, and ground and muscle cuts of beef, pork, lamb, chick-
en, and goat. The rule has been controversial with respect to meat products, lead-
ing Canada and Mexico to challenge the rule in the WTO, arguing that COOL has 
a trade-distorting impact by reducing the value and number of cattle and hogs 
shipped to the U.S. market.  In 2011, a WTO Panel found COOL rules to be in vio-
lation of the WTO, in 2012 the U.S. appealed, and was asked to amend the rule. 
After doing so, it is waiting for a decision from the WTO compliance panel to de-
termine if the final COOL rule complies with WTO findings.  See also, Dan Flynn, 
New COOL Rule Might Result in Retaliatory Tariffs, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May 24, 
2013), available at http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/05/new-cool-rule-
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A WTO claim can have many implications and has the poten-
tial to shape domestic and transnational regulatory governance 
through broader systemic influences.159  The SPS and TBT agree-
ments have been found to offer the same level of right to regulate, 
with the TBT jurisprudence showing a more cautious stance.160  
While much of the  litigation under SPS and TBT Agreements has 
led to a clarification of a regulatory norm, the cases where the dis-
pute took a long time to resolve or continues to persist (see, e.g., 
U.S.-Tuna) are more troublesome and underscore a need for coop-
erative regulation.161  
Critically, countries have gone so far as continuing to violate 
the WTO rules to preserve their right to regulate (see e.g., EU-
Hormones, the SPS case involving a European Union ban on meat 
imports treated with hormones).162  EU-Hormones illustrates that, 
for WTO members, the rules constrain the right to regulate only by 
making it more costly to exercise that right.  The European Union 
lost this case based on their adherence to the precautionary princi-
ple, and incurred trade-related remedies to the United States.  This 
illustrates that while most WTO Members view the rules as ‘hard’ 
constraints, some treat them as ‘soft’ constraints.  
 
                                                                                                               
might-result-in-retaliatory-tariffs/#.U-gQrGPou8w [https://perma.cc/T9RG-
NZ3K) (discussing potential retaliatory tariffs that Mexico and Canada could put 
in place after U.S. issued its regulation); Tenille Tracey, House Votes to Remove 
Country of Origin Labels on Meat Sold in the U.S., WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 10, 
2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-votes-to-remove-country-
of-origin-labels-on-meat-sold-in-u-s-1433990294 [https://perma.cc/9X4B-LAUC] 
(“The House voted late Wednesday to remove country-of-origin labels on beef, 
pork and chicken sold in the U.S., hoping to prevent a protracted battle over the 
labels with Canada and Mexico”).  
159 See generally Gregory C. Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes Regulatory Govern-
ance, 9 REG. & GOVERNANCE, 1 (2015) (providing a framework for assessing the 
regulatory implications of the WTO).  
160  See Wagner, Regulatory Space, supra note 2 at 66-67 (seeking to balance lib-
eralization of trade obstacles and state regulatory rights).   
161 See e.g., US—Tuna, supra note 153; US—Tuna II Appeal supra note 153 
(noting that in the US—Tuna II Art. 21.5 Appeal, the Appellate Body did not clari-
fy how the US should change its dolphin-safe tuna labeling scheme for it to be-
come compliant with WTO law. The judges stressed that, however, the measure 
lacked even-handedness in application, as it left US consumers with the risk of 
buying dolphin-unfriendly tuna products.) 
162  Compare how the EC continued to violate the WTO rules inEC— Hor-
mones with U.S. behavior-the U.S. rescinded Country of Origin Labeling 
(“COOL”) after the recent WTO ruling in US-COOL. 
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2.5.  ‘Imminent’ Regulatory Collisions     
 
Not all regulatory differences result in outright collisions, and 
many WTO trade disputes are resolved or prevented before they 
reach the consultation phase.  This section describes ‘imminent col-
lisions’—or regulatory differences, which may collide in the WTO, 
that show the most promise for cooperation.  
The data on ‘imminent collisions’ come from: formal notifica-
tions made by WTO Members to the WTO SPS or TBT Committees 
concerning newly adopted SPS or TBT measures, and informal 
concerns stemming from controversial regulations in the United 
States and elsewhere.  
The first source of data on imminent collisions comes from 
formal notifications from WTO Members to the WTO SPS Commit-
tee of any newly adopted SPS measures, or SPS measures which 
have been changed.  Under the WTO SPS and TBT Committees, 
members are free to raise Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) about 
other members’ measures, which they believe are inconsistent with 
provisions of the SPS or TBT Agreements.163  An examination of 
current concerns before these two reveals the type of regulatory 
collisions that are quelled before reaching the consultation phase.  
Since 1995, when the SPS Agreement was established, 312 STCs re-
garding SPS measures were raised, 28% of these concerning food 
safety.  Twenty-two food-standard-related STCs were raised in 
2010-11, nine regarding chemical maximum residue limits, six re-
garding specific foods, and two regarding labeling.  These cases il-
lustrate that SPS measures are actively contested. 
A recent meeting of the Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade examined 92 STCs regarding TBT measures in 2015 – the 
second-highest number in a single year since 1995.164  In the TBT 
arena, STCs can relate to standards, testing and certification proce-
dures, regulations or labeling requirements imposed by the im-
porting country, and are said to impact companies producing these 
goods and consumers who use them.  Two of the three most criti-
                                                 
163 See e.g. Note by the Secretariat, Specific Trade Concerns, WTO Doc. 
G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.16 (Feb. 23, 2016) (exemplifying an instance of member 
states raising trade concerns). 
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cal TBT concerns relate to food.  The first STC related to a proposed 
European Union ban on products derived from cloned animals,165 
where the United States and Brazil considered that this proposed 
measure may be more trade restrictive than necessary, and ques-
tioned the supporting scientific evidence.  The EU provided an up-
date on the ongoing decision-making process for this measure and 
expressed its willingness to further discuss the matter.  The second 
STC related to the limitation of entry points for apples into India 
and a European Union decision to withdraw “equivalence” recog-
nition of Indian organic products.166  
One final observation is that many STCs relate to labeling.  La-
beling concerns are increasingly important in the TBT Committee – 
a timely and relevant topic for the United States where nearly 300 
food labeling bills were introduced in state legislatures in 2014-15, 
including: nutrition disclosures, sugary drinks warnings, identifi-
cation of local products such as olive oil and seafood, and disclo-
sure of GMO ingredients. Indonesia, the EU, India, Ecuador and 
Chinese Taipei have brought STCs regarding labeling regulations 
on: sugar, salt and fat content, health messages on processed and 
packaged foods, different types of oils, genetically modified foods, 
and the inclusion on labeling of foods which are endocrine disrup-
tors.167 
                                                 
165 Id. Specifically, the STC was from the European Union — Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Cloning of Ani-
mals of the bovine, porcine, ovine, caprine and equine specifies kept and repro-
duced for farming purposes (197) and Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
placing on the market of food from animal clones (198).  
166 “With respect to India’s decision to limit the entry of apples to the port of 
Nhava Sheva, some delegations argued that this would increase delays and create 
additional costs for producers and exporters. India stated that this measure was 
neither a technical regulation, standard nor conformity assessment procedure, 
and therefore did not fall within the scope of application of the TBT Agreement. 
Regarding the EU decision to no longer recognize equivalence of India’s organic 
products, India was of the view that this measure was overly burdensome for 
producers and would hinder trade with the EU. The EU in turn argued that India 
had not satisfied provisions contained in the bilateral agreement which recog-
nized such equivalence.” WTO, Standards Committee Discusses Tyres, Toy Safety and 
Food, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/tbt_10nov15_e.htm (last 
accessed Sept. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/SX2J-HALF]. 
167 The regulations are: inclusion of sugar, salt and fat content information, as 
well as health messages on the label of processed foods (Indonesia); Categoriza-
tion of Compounds as Endocrine Disruptors’ (EU); Processed and Packaged Food 
Products (Ecuador); Canola Oil (India); genetically modified foods (Chinese Tai-
pei).  See Technical Barriers to Trade, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm (last viewed on 
9/30/2016) [https://perma.cc/9B6R-STYG] (providing a data base for viewing 
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Labeling rules corresponding to GMOs are an imminent 
regulatory collision.  Recall the discussion of AquAdvantage, an 
FDA-approved genetically modified salmon produced in the Unit-
ed States.  As noted previously, the United States and European 
approaches to regulating the production, cultivation, and trade in 
GMOs differ.  The labeling of GMOs is a controversial issue in the 
United States, with recently passed Federal GM legislation 
preempting individual state laws on the matter.168  The topic is 
equally controversial outside the United States where rules on 
genetically modified foods differ widely.  
Generally speaking, in the United States and elsewhere, many 
food regulations are being proposed that could evolve into immi-
nent collisions.  While, as noted, future measures to protect public 
health, animal health and plant health may include labeling of 
GMOs, future measures may also include: a ban on products relat-
ed to cloning, the use of growth hormones and endocrine disrupt-
ing chemicals, antimicrobial resistance to antibiotics, plant synthet-
ic biology, and laws related to the humane treatment of animals – 
such as the ‘State of California’s Egg Rule’ regulating the humane 
treatment of egg-laying chickens.169 
The regulation of nanotechnology is likely to invoke a regulato-
ry collision.  Nanotech is a new frontier170 backed by a billion-
dollar industry, which is expected to grow.171  Every major food 
corporation either has a program in nanotech or is looking to de-
                                                                                                               
regulations and cases). 
168 Mary Clarke Jalonick, Obama Signs Bill Requiring Labeling of GMO Foods, 
WASHINGTON POST (July 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
lifestyle/food/obama-signs-bill-requiring-labeling-of-gmo-foods/2016/07/29/
1f071d66-55d2-11e6-b652-315ae5d4d4dd_story.html [https://perma.cc/P8RQ-
WSRS]. For the individual state legislation this preempted, see State Labeling Initia-
tives, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY (2015), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/
issues/976/ge-food-labeling/state-labeling-initiatives# [https://perma.cc/K5XR-
KT6C]. 
169 See e.g. Treatment of Farm Animals Prohibitions, Cal. Health & Safety 
Code § 25990 (West) (requiring poultry eggs to come from chickens that have 
enough room to fully extend their limbs and turn around freely); Labeling of Food 
Produced with Genetic Engineering, Vt. Admin. Code 3-2-118A:CP 121 (requiring 
labeling of genetically modified foods); see also Regulation (EU) 2015/2283, 2015 
O.J. (L 327) 1 (the European Union’s regulation on nanofoods and cloned foods). 
170 See generally FAO/WHO Expert Meeting, supra note 6.   
171 See Tiju Johnson and Mark Morrison, Nanotechnology in Agriculture and 
Food, EUROPEAN NANOTECHNOLOGY GATEWAY (Apr. 2006) 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/nanotechnology_in_
agriculture_and_food.pdf [(citing a report produced by Helmut Kaiser Consultan-
cy, entitled Nanotechnology in Food and Food Processing Industry Worldwide).  
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velop one.172  And while such nanotechnology ingredients can be 
beneficial (holding promise in their ability to combat issues such as 
obesity, malnutrition), scientists are considering their potential 
health and safety risks for consumption.173  The FDA does not re-
quire nanoparticles to be labeled in foods but some consumers in 
the United States are lobbying for it.  Meanwhile, Codex sets 
standards on food additives, but does not set standards on either 
the use of nanotechnology in food or GMO labeling,174 making 
these issues ripe for an ‘imminent’ regulatory collision.  
The STCs illustrate that the field of possible disputes is larger 
than actual disputes which reach the WTO.  These imminent colli-
sions could be resolved through more mechanisms for internation-
al regulatory cooperation.  
 
3.  THE PROBLEM: CURRENT TREATIES DO NOT MEET THE DEMAND 
FOR MORE COOPERATIVE REGULATION   
 
New approaches to IRC are needed to raise levels of food safe-
ty, to keep pace with emerging new technologies in food produc-
tion and to mollify intensifying philosophical differences, regulato-
ry collisions, and imminent regulatory collisions.  This section 
describes a wish list for cooperative regulation to increase food 
safety-essentially, what is missing from traditional approaches to 
international regulatory cooperation leading to a new framework 
for cooperative regulation -- found in the Mega-Regional.   
   
                                                 
172 See Gaidos, supra note 7 (quoting Jozef Kokini, the Director of the Center 
for Advanced Food Technology at Rutgers University, USA).  
173 Id.    
174 See FAQ, Codex supra note 152 (“Codex has adopted principles and guide-
lines to assess food safety of foods derived from recombinant‐DNA plants, ani-
mals and microorganisms. If a government chooses to build a regulatory mecha-
nism to address the food safety of so‐called GM foods, then they can use Codex 
text as a basis for it. This being said, each government is free to adopt its own pol-
icy as to the use of GM organisms in the agriculture and other sectors. At the mo-
ment, there are no internationally‐agreed recommendations on the food labelling 
of GM foods. Governments are therefore applying their own regulations.”).  
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3.1.  The ‘Wish List’ for Expanding Cooperative Regulation to Raise 
Food Safety 
 
While countries face a menu of challenges, they also have a list 
of IRC techniques at their disposal.  To strengthen food safety, for 
example, the United States uses some but not all techniques.  This 
section provides a ‘wish list’ for cooperative regulation and pro-
poses the TPP as a mechanism for improving IRC and food safety.    
The WHO and the FAO have identified specific IRC needs with 
respect to food safety risks.  The World Health Organization re-
ports that surveillance of foodborne diseases is becoming an in-
creasingly high priority on the public health agenda of many coun-
tries.175  Cooperation is required on many levels—in the rapid 
detection of incidents, identification of causative agents and foods, 
and the prompt and effective response to contain and mitigate any 
adverse health and economic effects.  This includes maintaining 
sensitive and rapid alert systems, detailed and well-tested prepar-
edness plans, and rapid and effective emergency response systems 
with links to relevant international networks.176 
Meanwhile, the FAO notes that many non-industrialized coun-
tries lack the resources to conduct meaningful surveillance, and 
even the countries that undertake surveillance may be using differ-
ent methods and have different standards.177  These countries need 
trained staff in government, adequately staffed and equipped la-
boratories, and trained health care professionals to identify and re-
port diseases and timely alerts via current notification processes.178  
Establishing consistent laboratory methodologies and training, 
emergency preparedness training and procedures, database devel-
opment, further assistance for non-industrialized countries, and 
strengthened communication networks are key strategies to ad-
vance the status of international foodborne disease surveillance.  
Finally, the FAO notes that even in the United States, agencies  face 
problems with coordination in that the USDA and the FDA would 
benefit from better coordination, both nationally and international-
ly, linking surveillance outcomes with what we observe with foods 
                                                 
175 Id.  
176 See FAO, International Cooperation, supra note 65 (discussing the interna-
tional coordination of response systems to food safety risks).  
177 Id.  
178 Id.  
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in the United States.179   
Other elements on the ‘wish list’ are mechanisms to assist with 
risk assessment (the objective evaluation of the risk of certain activ-
ities) or risk management (the subjective process by which regula-
tors use the data produced during risk assessment and, combining 
data with relevant policy considerations, determine society’s risk 
preferences and what regulations are required to achieve those 
preferences).180  This emerges from the rise in trade conflicts related 
to philosophical differences and points to a need to coordinate 
regulatory policy in a way that manages and reduces those differ-
ences.  In the case of genetically modified foods, the regulatory 
problem is clear: while one side (the European Union) strongly 
supports regulations designed to prohibit or label genetically mod-
ified foods (risk management), the other side (the United States) 
counters that existing scientific studies identify little to no risk with 
such products (risk assessment).181  Here, regulatory disparities are 
not accidental:182 both sets of regulators are relying on disparate 
scientific studies, not because their citizens exhibit a unique level of 
risk tolerance.  While it may be impossible to separate issues of risk 
assessment and risk management183, regulatory cooperation on risk 
assessment may be possible through dialogue, information shar-
ing, and scientific fact-finding.184  Cooperation on risk assessment 
is possible by examining the science behind various regulatory ap-
proaches and determining which approach aligns with prevailing 
                                                 
179 Id. 
180 See Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Coop-
eration, supra note 34 (detailing a vision of cooperation in international regulatory 
risk assessment and risk management).  See also Bull, Answering, supra note 132 
(suggesting more careful disambiguation of risk assessment and risk management 
within the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership).  
181 See Bull, Answering, supra note 132 (discussing risk assessment with genet-
ically modified foods and other “unnatural” agricultural products).  
182 See Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Coop-
eration, supra note 34 at 58 (noting that accidental disparities have occurred when 
“trading partners have historically failed to coordinate regulatory policy and 
therefore often enact divergent regulatory approaches merely as a matter of his-
torical accident”).  
183 Risk management is subjective and depends on the risk tolerance of the 
population at issue.  For instance, the level of confidence required to accept a find-
ing as “proven” (e.g., a 95% level of confidence, or a 99% confidence interval), 
while essential to scientific investigations, represents a risk management determi-
nation.  
184 See Bull, Answering, supra note 132 (suggesting a more careful disambigua-
tion of risk assessment and risk management within the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership). 
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scientific knowledge.185  All credible scientists subscribe to the sci-
entific method as the mechanism applied to testing existing views, 
theories, and uncovering facts.186  At some point, scientists will de-
cide on a result using available data and empirical methods to test 
hypotheses.  And at some point, agencies will decide to foreclose 
consideration of any additional evidence in order to make a regula-
tory decision.187  Information-sharing among scientists worldwide 
can mitigate this problem by ensuring that new studies will diffuse 
as rapidly as possible across international boundaries.  As Reeve 
Bull points out, “the Administrative Conference of the United 
States has recommended that regulatory scientists work with their 
international counterparts to share data sets, divide responsibility 
for conducting otherwise duplicative tests, and achieve the effi-
ciencies that arise from maintaining a global network of research-
ers.”188 
Cooperation on risk management is more challenging because 
it depends on the public’s level of risk tolerance189, even if the gen-
eral public is more impressionistic than scientific190 and even when 
decision-making is skewed or captured.191  One suggestion is to 
enhance citizen input in agency policymaking, leading citizens to 
                                                 
185 See Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Coop-
eration, supra note 34 at 63 (suggesting methods to increase regulatory cooperation 
in risk management). 
186 See John L. Campbell, INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND THE SCIENTIFIC 
METHOD (2008) at 11 (cataloguing the scientific method’s rise to general ac-
ceptance in the community of scientists). 
187 See Wendy E. Wagner, SCIENCE IN REGULATION: A STUDY OF AGENCY 
DECISIONMAKING APPROACHES 26–27 (2013), https://web.archive.org/web/
20160514055832/http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CWK5-3NSL] (describing these rules as “Stopping rules”). 
188 See Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Coop-
eration, supra note 34, at 61 (citing the Administrative Conference of the United 
States, Recommendation 2011-6, International regulatory Cooperation, ¶¶ 3 – 6, 77 
Fed. Reg. 2257, 2260-61 (Jan. 17, 2012), and providing examples of facilitating in-
formation sharing).  
189 Id. at 63. 
190 See Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory 
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 55 – 56 (1995) (noting that “lay people assess risk 
through different value frameworks rather than those implicitly embedded in ex-
pert approaches”).  
191 See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information 
Capture, 59 DUKE L. J. 1321, 1324 – 25 (2010) (“In the regulatory context, infor-
mation capture refers to the excessive use of information and related information 
costs as a means of gaining control over regulatory decisionmaking in informal 
rulemakings”). 
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change policy from the “bottom up”.192  Of course, cooperation is 
possible if there are areas of mutual regulation.  For instance, in 
some contexts, the United States and European Union regulations 
exhibit similar levels of precaution (e.g., auto safety standards), 
and the likelihood of reaching agreement or mutual recognition is 
considerably greater in those areas.193 
 
3.2.  Comparing Traditional Agreements with the ‘Wish List’   
International economic treaties (Bilateral Investment Treaties194 
and WTO Agreements, for example) have traditionally helped reg-
ulators from different countries working together to increase un-
derstanding of regulations across boundaries and influence rule 
making from the bottom up.195  While Bilateral Investment Treaties 
promote standard-setting, harmonization and equivalence196, often 
                                                 
192 See generally Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democ-
racy”: A Theoretical and Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Deci-
sionmaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 611 (2013) (arguing that agencies should seek en-
hanced public input when it actually promotes a better outcome). 
193 See Bull, Answering, supra note 132 (discussing regulatory convergence 
when both sides treat issues with comparable levels of precaution).  
194 Traditional investment agreements like the Model U.S. Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty are similar to Investment Chapters found in regional trade agree-
ments with an investment chapter (e.g., The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, Chapter 11) and typically protect covered investments with “minimum 
standards” and “fair and equitable treatment.”   
195 See Ann-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government 
Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) 
(discussing the role of international government networks).  See also Janet Koven 
Levit, A Bottom-up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Fi-
nancial Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005) (analyzing the bottom-up ap-
proach in three instruments—letter of credit, export credit insurance, and the offi-
cial export credit guarantee); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International 
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (2002) (arguing that the development of linkages among government 
officials from diverse jurisdictions-peer-to-peer, using informal, often non-binding 
agreements, and with limited oversight by foreign ministers-has been increasingly 
recognized as an important component of contemporary cooperation). 
196 See European Commission Releases Draft Proposal on TTIP Investment Court, 
BRIDGES (Sept. 17, 2015), available at http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-
news/bridges/news/european-commission-releases-draft-proposal-on-ttip-
investment-court [https://perma.cc/EKN3-X2BM] (noting that protections in-
clude “guarantees against expropriation without compensation; the possibility of 
transferring investment-related funds, commitments to ensure fair and equitable 
treatment and physical security, commitments that governments respect obliga-
tions to investors that are written and legally binding, and guarantees of compen-
47
Marks: The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
  
48 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
in food related investment197, the focus here is on the WTO Agree-
ments and trade-related measures because those Agreements di-
rectly affect food safety and because those Agreements bind all 160 
member nations.     
Members of the WTO ascribe to a baseline level of cooperative 
regulation.  The original GATT agreement of 1947 originated in the 
postwar era—a period when policymakers fought to build a multi-
lateral open world economy that was compatible with the desire 
for national policy autonomy.198  Revised in 1996 when the WTO 
was formed, the GATT obligates Members to harmonize trade rela-
tions by reducing tariffs, removing non-tariff barriers, and promot-
ing free trade.  Provisions such as most-favored-nation (GATT Ar-
ticle III) and national treatment (GATT Article IV) give members 
the right to enact regulations on food and plant life that do not dis-
criminate against other nations or similar products.  And, as noted 
earlier, two WTO Agreements—the SPS Agreement and the TBT 
Agreement—promote harmonization and standard setting. 
The SPS Agreement encourages regulatory cooperation 
through standard-setting, harmonization, and equivalence. In 
terms of harmonization, according to the WTO SPS Agreement, 
Members have the right to regulate “to enact necessary measures” 
(SPS Article 2.1) “to the extent necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health” (SPS Article 2.2) so long as trade measures 
are not disguised trade restrictions.199  The SPS Agreement encour-
ages governments to apply measures that are based on interna-
tional standards (SPS Article 3.1)200—which, for international food 
standards (such as packing and labeling) are the standards ap-
proved by Codex.  Similarly, WTO Members are encouraged to 
base their domestic veterinary legislation on the international ref-
erence standards adopted by the World Organization for Animal 
Health.201  Standards beyond international standards are allowed 
                                                                                                               
sation for those losses that arise in specific circumstances, such as armed con-
flicts”). 
197 Investment chapters have the ability to stimulate investment in food and 
agriculture—such as investments can be in farmland, food processing, agricultur-
al inputs and services, wholesale distribution, and retail networks. 
198 John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36.2 International Organization 379, 379 – 
415 (1982). 
199 SPS Agreement, supra note 55. 
200 See id. at art. 3.1, 3.2, and Annex A(3) (outlining specific provisions on 
harmonization). 
201 In the absence of domestic legislation, contractors could request that pro-
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but only “if there is scientific justification” (SPS Article 3.3).202  Fi-
nally, the SPS encourages equivalence for a specific measure or 
measures related to a certain product or categories of products, or 
on a systems-wide basis (SPS Article 4).203  It emphasizes that 
equivalence of SPS measures does not require duplication or 
sameness of measures, but the acceptance of alternative measures 
that meet an importing Member's appropriate level of SPS protec-
tion.204 
Next, the WTO TBT Agreement preamble directly speaks to 
standard-setting by stating that it seeks “to encourage the devel-
opment of such international standards and conformity assessment 
systems” and to ensure “that technical regulations and standards, 
including packaging, marking and labelling requirements, and 
procedures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations 
and standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade.”205  At the same time, the TBT Agreement recognizes WTO 
members’ right to implement measures to achieve legitimate policy 
objectives, such as the protection of human health, safety, or the 
environment.  The TBT Agreement, like the SPS Agreement, en-
courages governments to harmonize technical standards with in-
ternational standards,206 unless those international standards are 
ineffective for fulfilling the legitimate objective of the technical 
                                                                                                               
ducers incorporate farming practices recommended by the OIE (like animal wel-
fare standards), to facilitate access to international markets Several standards ap-
ply: for animal health, see the standards and guidelines developed under the aus-
pices of the International Office of Epizootics, and for pant health, see the 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations under the auspices of 
the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) in coopera-
tion with regional organizations operating with the Framework of the IPPC. 
202 See SPS Agreement, supra note 55 at art. 3.3 (“Members may introduce or 
maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in a higher level of san-
itary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on 
the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a 
scientific justification”). 
203 See id. at art. 4 (encouraging equivalent treatment between sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure of other members to the agreement).   
204 Id.  
205 Agreement on Technical Barriers To Trade, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex A 1868 U.N.T.S. 
120 (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement] 
206 However, the TBT does not define ‘international standard’.  See WTO 
Newsroom on the TBT, World Trade Organization (2016), https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm [https://perma.cc/Z3VM-S6JT] 
(summarizing news on the TBT agreement).   
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regulation.207  Like the SPS, it also encourages ‘standard equiva-
lence’ between countries—the formal acceptance of the standards 
of other countries through explicit agreements.208  And like the SPS, 
it mandates that countries establish inquiry points and national no-
tification authorities in order to answer questions about TBT regu-
lations and to notify other WTO members of new regulations.209  
Finally, the TBT Agreement also encourages WTO Members to en-
ter into negotiations with other Members for the mutual ac-
ceptance of conformity assessment results.210 
While current treaties promote central IRC principles such as 
standard-setting, harmonization and equivalence, they are not able 
to provide everything on the wish list for cooperative regulation.  
Gaps remain in surveillance of foodborne diseases and coordina-
tion (which, for non-industrialized countries, means developing 
consistent laboratory methodologies and training, emergency pre-
paredness training and procedures, and database development), 
and in harmonizing risk assessment or risk management.  
Current international trade treaties are also unable to resolve 
some longstanding disputes and lingering issues remain in place.  
Take for example US-Poultry, a WTO case brought by China 
against the United States for a 2010 ban on Chinese poultry.211  In 
this case, the WTO Panel ruled against the United States, stating 
that the U.S. ban was not supported by scientific evidence.  At the 
time the measures were drafted, regulators were keenly aware of 
notable food safety breaches in China—the highly publicized mel-
amine in milk and adulterated pet food outbreaks—suggesting that 
regulators recognized that new supply chain partners (China) may 
not be able to provide the requisite regulatory framework and suf-
                                                 
207 See TBT Agreement, supra note 205 at art. 2.4. 
208 See id. at  2.7 (“Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as 
equivalent technical regulations of other Members”).  
209 See id. at art. 2.9 and 5.6 (outlining the notification measures to other na-
tions on new regulations).   
210 See id. at art 6.3 (“Members are encouraged, at the request of other Mem-
bers, to be willing to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of agreements for 
the mutual recognition of results of each other's conformity assessment proce-
dures”). 
211 See Panel Report, United States-Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry 
from China, ¶7.154, WT/DS392/R (Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter US-Poultry], availa-
ble at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/392r_e.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V5ST-TP6E] (last accessed Sept. 22, 2016) (noting that without a U.S. 
equivalence determination, China correctly argued, Chinese poultry products 
could not enter U.S. markets). 
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ficiently robust public health measures to ensure food safety.212  
Since the US-Poultry decision, China banned poultry from the 
United States for Avian Flu, and the United States is urging China 
to continue its poultry exports, showing that trade in poultry con-
tinues to be problematic between the two countries .213   
Finally, current international trade treaties have difficulty re-
solving cases regarding GMOs and food additives, where norma-
tive philosophies have a potential to collide.214  These cases high-
light the need for other alternatives, such as regulatory 
cooperation.  The following section shows how Mega-Regionals 
have the potential to provide more IRC mechanisms with respect 
to food safety. 
   
4.  SOLUTION: THE MEGA-REGIONAL AS A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ENHANCED COOPERATIVE REGULATION 
 
The process of harmonization that began over forty years ago 
with the GATT of 1947, and continued twenty years later with the 
formation of the WTO, is gaining strength with greater determina-
tion through a new type of trade agreement, the Mega-Regional.    
 
4.1.  Mega-Regionals Expand Cooperation Found in Traditional 
Treaties 
 
The movement from traditional to modern agreements has 
                                                 
212 See Donald H. Regan, United States-Certain Measures Affecting Imports of 
Poultry from China: The Fascinating Case That Wasn’t, 11 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 2, 
273, 276 – 7 (2012) (observing that this was the first instance in which the basis for 
the challenge was the claimed inability of the complainant country to enforce its 
own food-safety rules).  See also Lukasz Gruszczynski, United States-Certain 
Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China—Just Another SPS Case? 2 
EUROPEAN J. OF RISK REGULATION 3, 432, (2011) (outlining the developments in SPS 
law created by the US-Poultry decision). 
213 See William Maudlin, U.S. Challenges China Over Chicken as Trade Friction 
Rises: Obama Administration Demands that China Open its Market to U.S. Chicken, 
WALL ST. J., May 10, 2016, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-
challenges-china-over-chicken-as-trade-friction-rises-1462881223 [https://
perma.cc/V427-S7VB] (detailing the United States challenge to China’s trade 
measure).  
214 See supra note 96 at 262 (discussing the challenges that the GMOs cases 
have put on the dispute settlement system).  
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been a learning experience; regulators have carried forward suc-
cesses and make improvements in terms of standard-setting, har-
monization, and equivalence.  Generally the transnational govern-
ance literature shows that regulatory norms do not emerge in 
isolation, but grow from public and private networks working to-
gether to create standards and regulations that are either mandates 
or that get adopted informally through industry practice, industry 
consensus, and/or market forces, moving across borders and re-
gimes.215   
In many ways, the TPP carries forward ‘best practices’ from 
prior agreements.  First, the TPP carries forward best practices 
found in domestic policies.  For instance, the TPP creates another 
means for regulators to advance their agencies’ regulatory mis-
sions.  Provisions found in the United States Food Safety and Mod-
ernization Act of 2012 are similar to the TPP rules, showing that 
the TPP reinforces those rules.216  Second, the TPP also carries for-
ward best practices found in international agreements.  While pre-
vious international agreements had some safeguards in place217, 
                                                 
215 Greg Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change: Opportunities and 
Constraints, LAW AND SOCIETY INQUIRY, 3 (2012).  See generally, Shaffer, 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 37 (compiling literature on transnation-
al governance mechanisms). 
216 Compare Trans Pacific Partnership ch. 7, art. 7.10,7.12  4 February 2016, 
available at  [Hereinafter TPP SPS], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-
Final-Text-Sanitary-and-Phytosanitary-Measures.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YKS-
EDQG] (“If  an  importing  Party  requires  certification  for  trade  in  a  good,the 
Party shall  ensure that the certification  requirement  is  applied,  in  meeting the 
Party’ sanitary  or  phytosanitary objectives,  only  to  the  extent  necessary  to  
protect human, animal or plant life or health”), with FDA Accreditation of Third-
Party Certification Bodies To Conduct Food Safety Audits and To Issue Certifica-
tions, 21 C.F.R. § 1.651 (2016) (requiring third-party certification bodies accredited 
under this the FDA guidelines to perform unannounced facility audits and to noti-
fy the FDA upon discovering a condition that could cause or contribute to a seri-
ous risk to public health). 
217 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 
17,1991, 32 I.L.M. 289, 1114 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Treaty Between the Unit-
ed States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encour-
agement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (Revised 2004), 
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp [https://perma.cc/8RZC-
VZM9] [hereinafter US Model BIT]; United States-Colombia Trade Protection 
Agreement, U.S.-Colom., May 15, 2015, (2015), http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM9Q-
8MEY]; Free Trade Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of Ko-
rea, U.S.-S. Kor., Mar. 15, 2012 (2012), http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/
eeb/tpp/c26397.htm [https://perma.cc/XM9Q-8MEY]; United States- Panama 
Trade Promotion Agreement, Oct. 31, 2012 (2012), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/e/eeb/tpp/c26397.htm [https://perma.cc/XM9Q-8MEY]; United 
52
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/1
  
2016] RIGHT TO REGULATE 53 
modern agreements like the TPP have more safeguards for invest-
ment, competition, the environment, climate, labor, food scarcity, 
and animal welfare.218  The TPP includes a dedicated chapter for 
financial services trade, perhaps because countries like Chile and 
Malaysia both deployed cross-border financial regulations re-
sponding to prior financial crises.219   
Other best practices found in international agreements are 
those found generally in the WTO SPS Agreement, and also in the 
SPS Chapters in other agreements.  For instance, the WTO SPS 
Agreement contains a notification procedure to resolve disputes 
before they reach the Panel stage.  In one study, Professor Alberto 
Alemano compares the number of specific trade concerns raised in 
front of the Committee and the limited number of disputes litigat-
ed under the SPS Agreement and concludes that the low number of 
WTO disputes can be attributed to the WTO SPS Committee notifi-
cation system.220  From over 300 concerns raised to the SPS Com-
mittee, only fifteen led to established Panels.221  The TPP has a noti-
fication process similar to the deliberative process of the SPS 
Committee to resolve more disputes. 
In terms of higher standards, the TPP, like other modern 
                                                                                                               
States-Peru Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 12, 2006, (2006), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/e/eeb/tpp/c26397.htm [https://perma.cc/XM9Q-8MEY]; Domin-
ican Republic-Central America Free Trade America, U.S.-Dom. Rep.-Costa Rica-
Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., Jun. 30, 2005, (2005), https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-
fta/final-text [https://perma.cc/S575-JU2R]; Canadian Model Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of  Investments, (Revised 2004), 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A273-NTEL]; EU-Canada (CETA), India and Singapore-EC 
Negotiating Mandate on Investment, E.U.-Can.-India-Sing., Sept. 15, 2011 (2011), 
http://www.bilaterals.org/?eu-negotiating-mandates-on [https://perma.cc/
C7S4-VR7N] (including safeguards for the environment and labor).   
218 Many modern agreements contain chapters on competition, and other 
chapters address the use of child labor, deforestation, and wildlife trafficking in 
other countries to secure unfair trade advantages, in response to requests to level 
the playing field among trading nations.  See TPP Draft, supra note 27 at ch. 9, art. 
9.16; ch. 20, art. 20.10; ch. 19, art. 19.7 (addressing issues of child labor, deforesta-
tion, and wildlife trafficking). 
219 See Ricardo French-Davis, Kevin P. Gallagher, Mah-Hui Lim, and Kathe-
rine Soverel, Financial Stability and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Lessons from Chile 
and Malaysia, 6 GLOBAL POLICY 4, 330 – 342 (Nov. 2015) (elaborating on the finan-
cial stability measures included in the Trans-Pacific Partnership in relation to pri-
or issues in Chile and Malaysia). 
220 See Alemano, supra note 33 at 20 (noting that the WTO SPS Article 7 states 
this requirement). 
221 Id.   
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agreements, provides “WTO-plus” features—features that provide 
more trade protection than the WTO agreements.222  TPP SPS 
Chapter 7 contains SPS protection that goes beyond protection 
found in the WTO Agreements, or “WTO-plus” features.223  The 
TPP goes further to increase food safety cooperation by encourag-
ing more cooperation,224 more information sharing,225 and more di-
alogue in the form of annexes, ad hoc agreements, and memoranda 
of understanding.226 
The TPP SPS Chapter mentions that it “builds upon and rein-
forces” the WTO SPS Agreement.227  A study of Regional Trade 
Agreements performed by the OECD found that nearly 40% of 
them are ‘WTO-plus’ with the inclusion of additional specific 
commitments and procedures.228  Regional and Free Trade agree-
ments often include SPS Chapters which are “WTO-plus” in that 
they bring greater standards than those afforded by the WTO, in-
corporating deeper SPS commitments in the form of annexes, ad 
hoc agreements, and memoranda of understanding, with proce-
dures to be followed to implement them and/or within a specified 
time frame.  For example, a study of the United States and Europe-
an Union agreements with Korea, the United States agreement 
with Panama, and the EU-CARIFORUM Agreement finds that the 
SPS Chapters of United States agreements are fairly short, primari-
                                                 
222 See Brunet Marks, supra note 31 (arguing that “WTO-plus” features gener-
ally and “SPS-plus” and “TBT-plus” features provide more than the traditional 
SPS and TBT protection).  
223 See id. (describing that range of standards available- the WTO provides 
‘baseline’ standards, with Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements providing 
higher-than-the-baseline, SPS-plus standards, with private standards providing 
the highest level of food safety).  
224 See Trans Pacific Partnership, supra note 216, at art. 7.15 (encouraging par-
ties to explore further areas of cooperation and information exchange on sanitary 
and phytosanitary matters). 
225 Id. at art. 7.16. 
226 See e.g. Trans Pacific Partnership Related Industries, Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Letters of Exchange with Chile, Canada and Vietnam. 4 February 2016, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-
partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/D5MR-8QXX] (exchanging letters of 
understanding on salmonid eggs, milk equivalence, catfish, and offals).  
227 See Trans Pacific Partnership, supra note 216, at art. 7.2b (noting that the 
TPP builds on and extends the WTO SPS Chapter).  
228 See Fulponi, Shearer and Almeida, Regional Trade Agreements-Treatment of 
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ly functioning to establish a bilateral committee for consultation 
and coordination for understanding one another’s SPS measures 
and their implementation and to set out responsibilities to establish 
the committee and hold its meetings.  Both agreements exempt 
their SPS chapters from regional dispute settlement procedures.  
Side agreements on equivalency are part of the WTO-plus. For 
example, a side agreement to the United States Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) with Panama included Panama’s recognition of United 
States SPS and related regulatory systems as equivalent to Pana-
ma’s for meat, poultry, dairy and processed products.229  A side 
agreement to the US-Colombia FTA and US-Peru FTA included 
recognition of United States meat and poultry inspection system as 
equivalent and to accept USDA export certificates.230  Sometimes 
countries want to negotiate bilaterally.  A good example is China, 
who sought to resolve the poultry equivalence issue with the Unit-
ed States long before it sought to bring it to the multilateral 
WTO.231  The TPP continues a United States tradition of adding 
side agreements to Free Trade Agreements.  The TPP contains five 
side agreements that are SPS-related—one between United States 
and Chile regarding Salmonid Eggs, one between United States 
and Canada regarding equivalence for milk, and two between the 
United States and Vietnam on catfish and offals (variety meats), re-
spectively.232   
While the SPS Chapters that the United States drafts are similar 
to one another, SPS Chapters that the European Union drafts are 
different from the United States and also from one another.233  The 
European Union has Agreements that establish committees,234 and 
                                                 
229 See Agreement Regarding Certain Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and 
Technical Standards Affecting Trade in Agriculture Products, in BILATERAL AND 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS, Simon Lester, Bryan 
Mercurio (eds.) (2008) at xxviii.   
230 See id. at 30 (explaining annexes and ad hoc agreements includes in the SPS 
commitments). 
231 See Gruszczynski, supra note 212 (discussing the timeline and challenges 
behind the US-Poultry SPS case).  
232 See TPP SPS, supra note 216 (containing letters of exchange between the 
U.S. and Chile, Canada, and Vietnam on regulation of certain foods). 
233 See Agreement Regarding Certain Sanitary, supra note 229 at 152. 
234 The EU-Korea agreement establishes an on-going committee and places 
attention to be determining pest-or disease-free areas by a two year ‘confidence-
building activity’, to be confirmed by the WTO SPS Committee.  If a party rejects 
the determination of the other, the parties may begin consultations with each 
agreeing to be open for inspection, testing and other procedures. 
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some that do not.235  There is a trend to include provisions on mu-
tual recognition in international agreements.236  
 
4.2.  Mega-Regionals Provide New Mechanisms for Regulatory 
Cooperation 
 
Mega-Regionals are a relatively new and unexplored phenom-
enon, judging from an emerging literature of primarily economic 
working papers and studies predicting gains and losses.237  But as a 
new mechanism for cooperative regulation, they show great prom-
ise.  These agreements are expansive and provide regulatory flexi-
bility (the ‘right to regulate’)238  in a number of areas: to regulate in 
                                                 
235 See Agreement Regarding Certain Sanitary, supra note 229 at 152. (comment-
ing that the EU-CARIFORUM agreement does not have a committee but focuses 
more on cooperation for technical assistance for SPS-type measures within the re-
gion and to promoting harmonization of standards with the possibility of bilateral 
equivalency agreements).  
236 The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Mutual Recognition Agreement 
represents an improved example of a multilateral agreement. The APEC Mutual 
Recognition Arrangement of Food and Food Products consists of a framework ar-
rangement and separate implementation arrangements. In these Arrangements 
the importer accepts that food conforms to the other party’s requirements.  See 
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 23 (analyzing the overall impact of mega-
regional agreements on among other things, food safety measures).   
237 See Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-
State Arbitration of Intellectual Property Monopolies: Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans 
Pacific Partnership, in NE. PUB. L. AND THEORY FACULTY RESEARCH PAPERS SERIES 42-
2015 (2015) (addressing Intellectual Property and the TPP); Mega-Regional Trade 
Agreements, Game Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System, 
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (July 2014), http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_MegaRegionalTradeAgreements_Report
_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL5B-2GG5] (discussing the utility of Mega-
Regional Trade Agreements); Remy Jurenas, How Could Mega-Regional Trade Nego-
tiations Affect Agriculture and Food Trade (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., 
Issue Paper No. 57, 2015), http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/
research/How%20Could%20Mega-Regional%20Trade%20Negotiations%
20Affect%20Agricultural%20and%20Food%20Trade.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F6B-
U6SF] (explaining how Mega-Regional Trade Negotiations affect food trade); Da-
vid A. Gantz, The TPP and RCEP: Mega Trade Agreements for the Pacific Rim, Arizo-
na Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 15-36 (2015), published at 33 Ariz. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 57 (2016) (explaining the impact of Mega-Regional trade agreements on 
non-parties); see also Dan Ciuriak & Harsha Vardhana Singh, Mega Regional Trade 
Agreements: How Excluded Countries Can Meet the Challenge 8 (2015), 
http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload_files/Report_3_54_Mega_6009607286.p
df [https://perma.cc/8VLS-SKC3] (including a review of economic studies calcu-
lating gains and losses). 
238 Other mega regionals, however, have the ‘right to regulate’ language ex-
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the public interest,239 for financial stability, for the environment,”240, 
and for public health.241  Even more, the TPP requires new, more 
committed levels of cooperation compared to looser forms of coop-
eration found in other agreements (such as principles-based inter-
national standards, information sharing, research collaboration, in-
ternational early warning systems, and capacity building). 
Most importantly, however, the TPP breaks with prior econom-
ic treaty conventions in that it introduces three new mechanisms for 
cooperation.242  First, the TPP responds directly to the need for a 
more deliberative process for SPS related issues by adding a new 
due process element for countries to discuss issues of concern: a 
‘Cooperative Technical Consultation’.243  This feature is a mecha-
nism for a quick determination on an SPS dispute between mem-
bers before resorting to the dispute settlement provisions of the 
agreement or to the WTO.  While the TPP does not specifically 
                                                                                                               
plicitly in the text.  The draft TTIP includes language specific to the “right to regu-
late”: Article 2 affirms that the provisions “shall not affect the right of Parties to 
regulate within their territories through measures necessary to achieve legitimate 
policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, environment or 
public morals, social or consumer protection or promotion and protection of cul-
tural diversity.”  See European Commission Releases Draft Proposal on TTIP Invest-
ment Court, BRIDGES WEEKLY (Sept. 7, 2015), http://
www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/review/bridgesweekly19-30.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7QCJ-W979] (demonstrating that a newly elected official has the ‘right 
to regulate’ policy in Australia). 
239 See Att’y Gen.’s Dep’t, Gov’t of Austl., Tobacco Plain Packaging— Investor 
Arbitration, https://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging [https://perma.cc/
KX8N-U8HL] (last visited Oct. 5, 2016) (discussing the public health concerns be-
hind the passage of a Tobacco Act in Australia).  
240 See Hale, supra note 15 (commenting on the opening remarks to the TPP 
Investment Chapter); see also Tradewinds, The Official Blog of the USTR, (March 
2014), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/blog/2014/March/
Facts-Investor-State%20Dispute-Settlement-Safeguarding-Public-Interest-
Protecting-Investors [https://perma.cc/4SW4-35H9]  (explaining how the United 
States’ trade agreements protect Americans doing business in the United States).   
241 Public health measures are described in the TPP with reference to adopt-
ing tobacco control measures in order to protect public health.  Member parties 
cannot use the Investment Chapter to bring investment claims against one anoth-
er’s tobacco control measures.  
242 See Simon Lester & Inu Barbee, The Challenge of Cooperation: Regulatory 
Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic and Investment Partnership, 16 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 
847-867 (2013) (noting that some claims of potential benefits of the TTIP are over-
stated, but facilitating regulatory cooperation is nevertheless very much worth 
undertaking). 
243 See TPP SPS, supra note 215, at ch. 7, art. 7.17 (outlining the protocols and 
procedures countries must follow regarding sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures).  
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mention nanotechnology, one could foresee importing countries 
establishing SPS measures (for example, labeling measures) 
that are not scientifically based on nanofoods and nanotechnol-
ogy (the European Union already has a moratorium on 
nanofoods and labeling requirements, so countries also adhering 
to the precautionary principle could potentially do the same)244.  
If United States exports incorporating nanotechnology are 
banned, United States regulations on food additives (where Codex 
sets a standard) and nanotechnology (where Codex does not set a 
standard) could come under review under the ‘Cooperative Tech-
nical Consultations’ provision.245 
Second, the TPP contains a ‘Regulatory Coherence Chapter’, a 
new feature to trade agreements, as an explicit and strong com-
mitment to regulatory cooperation.246  Although much of the Regu-
latory Coherence Chapter needs to be further clarified, chapters 
like this are not found in traditional (WTO) agreements and the 
TPP is the first international agreement to have such a Chapter.  
This Chapter expressly promotes regulatory cooperation arguing 
for the “use of good regulatory practices in the process of planning, 
designing issuing, implementing and reviewing regulatory 
measures in order to facilitate achievement of domestic policy ob-
jectives, and in efforts across governments to enhance regulatory 
cooperation.”247  The use of good regulatory practices includes  
performing ‘impact assessments” when developing proposed cov-
ered regulatory measures, that “examine feasible alternatives” and 
their “costs and benefits” – in essence, this means adopting notice 
and comment procedures, enhanced stakeholder participation, ac-
cess to information and mutual consultation.248  A Committee on 
Regulatory Coherence is to be formed and cooperation encouraged 
                                                 
244 Novel Foods: MEPs Call for Moratorium on Nano-Foods and Labelling of Cloned 
Meat, European Parliament News (Nov. 25, 2014), http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20141125IPR80424/
20141125IPR80424_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC4Z-2CQL] (explaining that 
“MEPs nonetheless amended the text and proposed a moratorium on the use of 
nanomaterials in food, based on the precautionary principle. They also added 
provisions for compulsory labelling of cloned food products”). 
245 See TPP SPS, supra note 234, at ch. 7, art. 7.17 (outlining the Cooperative 
Technical Cooperations procedures). 
246 See Trans Pacific Partnership ch. 25, Feb. 4 2016 [Hereinafter TPP RC] 
[https://perma.cc/2YKS-EDQG] (announcing the regulatory coherence provi-
sions of the TPP). 
247 Id. at 25.2(1). 
248 Id. at 25.5(2). 
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and strengthened through “information exchanges, training pro-
grams, and other relevant activities between regulatory agen-
cies”.249 These may allow parties to resolve frictions earlier, before 
a regulatory dispute escalates. Third, the TPP includes a Market 
Access Chapter, which includes a section on bioengineering and 
additives250 —areas which have been ripe for regulatory collisions.  
In light of complaints (from the European Union) over trade in ge-
netically modified organisms, the United States drafted language 
in the TPP to preempt any future complaints from countries es-
pousing similar views as the European Union in this realm.  Final-
ly, another Chapter entitled, “Trade in Products of Modern Bio-
technology”, notes that products derived from agricultural 
biotechnology are grown in 28 countries, traded widely, and that 
the “TPP includes commitments to provide transparency on gov-
ernment measures on biotechnology trade”.251  It also provides for 
information sharing and procedures for Parties to follow when the 
low-level presence of biotech material is detected in a shipment of 
agricultural commodities or food products. 252   
Finally, the TPP contains other features to nudge countries to-
ward regulatory cooperation.  The TPP Chapter on Labor, Chapter 
19, contains labor protection regulations which, if not adopted and 
implemented, allow the United States to withhold or suspend tariff 
reductions specified in the treaty.253   
An example regarding GMOs best illustrates how these TPP 
features may operate.  Recognizing that issues with GMOs have 
been raised in the WTO in the past and are a continuing con-
cern in trade negotiations,254 one could imagine other TPP 
                                                 
249 Id. at 25.7(1). 
250 See Trans Pacific Partnership ch. 2 Feb. 2016, [Hereinafter TPP National 
Treatment] [https://perma.cc/2YKS-EDQG] (explaining procedures followed re-
lated to agricultural goods made using modern biotechnology).  
251 See Id. at art. 2.32 (outlining the transparency measures within the TPP). 
252 Id.  
253 See Trans Pacific Partnership ch. 19 Feb. 2016, [Hereinafter TPP Labor] 
[https://perma.cc/2YKS-EDQG] (containing a letter between U.S. and Vietnam 
for Enhancement of Trade and Labor Relations); see also id. at §V(B)(VIII) (explain-
ing that the Review of Implementation states that the United States may withhold 
or suspend any TPP tariff reductions should Vietnam not uphold labor liberaliza-
tion provisions).  
254 See US Officials 'Disappointed' the EU Wants to Let Member States Decide 
Whether to Allow GMO Products, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-us-says-new-eu-plan-for-gmo-imports-is-
no-solution-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/M385-VGWA] (noting EU proposal to al-
low the 28 member states to individually decide whether to allow the import of 
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Members requiring labeling of GMOs in food (following the Eu-
ropean Union precautionary principle model).  A TPP Member 
could raise a concern with GMO labeling rules in another TPP 
Member by invoking the TPP SPS Agreement, under the ‘Coop-
erative Technical Consultations’ provision.255  This same issue 
could also be raised in the TPP Market Access Chapter, under the 
section on “products of biotechnology” which establishes a mech-
anism for importing countries to decide on product safety and es-
tablishes a working group for the topic.256  However, even before a 
Member country implements a new rule, countries are to inform 
each other of new rules under the Regulatory Coherence Chapter 
and a Committee on Regulatory Coherence will review impact as-
sessments and cost benefit analyses.  In this way, regulatory coop-
eration takes place before and after rule-making through special 
cooperative committees, and even then, in some cases (labor) treaty 
benefits are rescinded before the onset of a trade dispute under the 
dispute settlement provisions in the TPP Agreement or under the 
WTO.  
While Mega-Regionals represent an evolution towards more 
regulatory cooperation, positive and negative externalities are in-
evitable.  
5.  EXTERNALITIES  
 
While mechanisms aimed at cooperative regulation result in 
positive externalities, such as regulatory coherence, there are po-
tential negative externalities, such as limits to policy space and sci-
entific examination.   
 
5.1.  Positive Externalities  
 
Regulatory coordination, marked by the use of harmonization, 
standard-setting, and recognition of equivalence has several poten-
tial benefits.  Regulatory cooperation has the potential to reduce 
                                                                                                               
genetically modified organisms or food, animal feed and other products made 
with them). 
255 See TPP SPS, supra note 215, at ch. 7, art. 17 (outlining the protocols and 
procedures countries must follow regarding sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures). 
256 See TPP National Treatment, supra note 252, at ch. 2. 
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regulatory collisions and imminent collisions in the WTO.  It also 
has the potential to raise standards not only within the TPP but be-
yond the TPP by encouraging exports from Regional Trade 
Agreement-based firms to nations outside of the agreement.257  
One example of this is the European Union’s Global System for 
Mobile Communications standard.258  When 300 million European 
consumers embraced this standard, many non-European Union na-
tions embraced it as well.  Developing countries adhere to stand-
ards that are more appropriate to wealthier counterparts.  Regula-
tory coherence aided Nokia and other European Union firms to 
compete in developing countries and overall, it helped European 
Union firms win the global standards competition.  
Generally, regulatory coherence spanning geographic areas the 
size of the TPP tends to spill over into countries outside of the 
agreement.  For example, Switzerland and Norway are not mem-
bers of the European Union but adopted European Union Single 
Market standards as they emerged.259  In food safety, harmoniza-
tion has led to many benefits such as enhanced trade, possible en-
hanced food safety, and again, positive spillovers to countries out-
side of the agreement.  
 
5.2.  Negative Externalities  
 
Five negative externalities related to IRC deserve mention, such 
as limiting regulatory innovation, restricting transparency, foster-
ing technoimperialism, and moving away from the scientific 
standard.  
First, international regulatory harmonization at the level of na-
tion-states may be unattainable or undesirable260 based on several 
                                                 
257 See Joseph Francois et al., Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and In-
vestment: An Economic Assessment, Study for the European Commission, CEPR 
REPORT (2013) (assessing the impact of reduced trade barriers on TPP nations and 
third nations like Indonesia).  
258 See Mobile Technology GSM, EUROPEAN TECH. STANDARDS INS. (2016) 
http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/mobile/gsm 
[https://perma.cc/8LCE-SEF3] (providing a definition of the Global System 
Communication Standard).  
259 See Francois, supra note 257, at 29 (discussing the role of the EU as a trad-
ing partner, encouraging others to adopt its standards).  
260 See generally Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: An Alternative 
to Harmonization in CORNELL L. FACULTY PUB. PAPER 880 (2013), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/
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negative externalities, such as the losses to regulatory innovation, 
transparency, and strict scientific examination.  Professor Riles ar-
gues that in financial regulation there are discrete benefits from 
maintaining a diverse group of inconsistent regulations.261  Profes-
sors Weiner and Alemanno defend regulatory heterogeneity by 
highlighting innovation benefits.262  Proponents of heterogeneity 
and the way in which IRC generates harmonized substantive regu-
latory requirements has been to focus IRC on less-intrusive regula-
tory objectives, including cooperation on regulatory impact analy-
sis (RIA) and risk-assessment processes, and to focus on intensive 
consultation and information-sharing.263 
 Second, the TPP has the potential to limit transparency for 
some countries.  The TPP involves negotiation between key eco-
nomic actors—nation-states, private parties (investors), and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)—with each actor command-
ing influence and driving certain priorities.  For a glimpse into in-
vestor priorities in the right to medicines debate, one only needs to 
look at the influential role of the pharmaceutical sector (“Big 
Pharma”) in influencing the Intellectual Property Chapters of the 
TPP (e.g., pushing for restraining competition in the trade of bio-
logics).264  
Third, the negotiations involve a heterogeneous mix of devel-
oped and developing countries negotiating to meet a consensus.  In 
the TPP, negotiations between the United States (a developed 
country example) and Vietnam (a developing country example) in-
volved multiple concessions.265  The lack of developing country in-
put into the formation of standards translates into what some ob-
                                                                                                               
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2378&context=facpub [https://perma.cc/VNT6-
3UL5] (confronting the prevailing wisdom that regulatory arbitrage can be coun-
teracted only if the rules across all legal systems are harmonized, stating that 
‘choice of law’ can be used to address persistent regulatory differences).  
261 Id.  
262 See Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International 
Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process Toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 
78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 4, 2015 (stating that regulatory heterogeneity is im-
portant for innovation—countries can experiment and be laboratories for experi-
mentation). 
263 See Bull et al., New Approaches, supra note 34, at 15 (discussing the use of 
cooperation on regulatory impact analysis as a less intrusive objective). 
264 See supra note 115.  
265 See US–Vietnam Plan for Enhancement of Trade and Labor Relations, Trans Pa-
cific Partnership ch. 19 Feb. 2016 (presenting letters exchanged between the Unit-
ed States and Vietnam in the negotiation process). 
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servers have called ‘technoimperialism’, or the imposition of stand-
ards by rich countries upon poor ones.266  Finally, nations may lose 
their authority to regulate on public health matters due to the het-
erogeneity in the provisions negotiated.  Agreements cover so 
much ground that ‘a gain in one chapter’ is ‘a loss in another’.   
Fourth, in some areas, the TPP SPS Agreement itself may pro-
vide for less working autonomy to regulate.  For intellectual prop-
erty protection, the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) states, “Members shall be free 
to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provi-
sions of the Agreement within their own legal system and prac-
tice.”267  The SPS Agreement is not as broad as this TRIPS Agree-
ment provision; however, the SPS Agreement provides less 
autonomy to regulate from the start.  When Professor Frankel as-
serts, “all of the international negotiations and agreements over in-
tellectual property have the cumulative effect of curbing national 
autonomy that the TRIPS agreement naturally allows,”268 the same 
is less relevant for the SPS Agreement.  Compared to the TRIPS 
Agreement, there was less autonomy with the SPS from the begin-
ning.  
 Fifth, the movement toward a Mega-Regional, and its many 
committees and consultation avenues for dispute-resolution, can 
be viewed as a movement away from a scientific standard (and 
counterintuitively towards the precautionary principle).269  The 
WTO has historically been viewed as a science-based framework.  
And yet, there are those who see this science-based framework as 
overly restrictive270 and others who argue that factors outside of 
                                                 
266 See FAO/WHO Expert Meeting, supra note 6, at 1949.  
267 See Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 82, 84 – 85   (1994) (providing that “members shall give effect to the provi-
sions of this Agreement.  Members may, but shall not be obligated to, implement 
in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, pro-
vided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.  
Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the 
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”)  
268 Susy Frankel, Eroding National Autonomy from the TRIPS Agreement, in 
INT’L ECON. L. AND NAT’L AUTONOMY 114 (Meredity Kolsky Lewis & Susy Frankel 
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2010). 
269 I thank Hillary Allen for raising this point. 
270 See Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence 
Requirements, a Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 354 (2002) (arguing that the 
scientific benchmark represents undue hurtles for regulators who sincerely pur-
sue objectives other than protectionism).  But see Robert Hudec, Science and Post-
Discriminatory WTO Law, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 185, 189 (2003) (discussing 
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science should drive regulation.271  As Tracey Epps notes, “one of 
the key questions raised regarding the scientific evidence bench-
mark is its appropriateness in democracies where public sentiment 
finds a risk worthy of regulation contrary to the views of ex-
perts.”272  Any scientific process, she argues, “is in fact highly inde-
terminate, subjective and vulnerable to manipulation and capture 
by protectionist interests”273; science may not be the best, but it is 
the best we have. 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In an era of emerging technologies in food production, coun-
tries want to preserve their right to regulate food safety risks.  But 
in reality, countries operate in a free trade framework where chal-
lenges to domestic regulations in the WTO and other venues are 
common.  In this context, countries shop for new agreements that 
enable them to maintain regulatory flexibility and also provide co-
ordination of efforts internationally to ensure food safety.  
This Article argues that traditional models of international reg-
ulatory cooperation are failing to provide the regulatory coopera-
tion countries need.  Mega-Regionals, with the TPP as the leading 
exemplar, provide a new promising mechanism for IRC and a way 
                                                                                                               
the interaction between science and WTO law); Jeffery Atik, Science and Interna-
tional Regulatory Convergence, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 736, 758 (1997) (explaining 
that science can sometimes alter decision-makers regulatory actions); Vern Walk-
er, The Myth of Science as a Neutral Arbiter for Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 197, 228 (2003) (demonstrating that “science can[not] serve as a 
‘neutral arbiter’ for triggering precautionary measures.”).  Presumably this was in 
response to political pressure arising out of the aforementioned Phillip Morris 
case. 
271 Other critics are concerned with the apparent exclusion by the SPS 
Agreement of non-scientific justifications for measures, arguing that reliance on 
science is misplaced because it precludes any consideration of social, cultural and 
ethical concerns and that nations will find their sovereignty diminished if there is 
no space for consumer anxieties to be respected and domestic politics accommo-
dated.  See Dayna Nadine Scott, Nature/Culture Clash: The Transnational Trade De-
bate Over GMOs 42 (New York: Hauser Global Law Program, Global Law Work-
ing Paper 06/05, 2005) (arguing that factors other than science should drive 
regulation); see also Walker, supra note 270, at 225 (“Non-scientific decisions are 
inherent in the findings about risk needed to justify precautionary measures un-
der the SPS Agreement”). 
272 Epps, supra note 134, at 299.  
273 Id. 
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to achieve higher food safety outcomes.  
The TPP provides new mechanisms to help complete the ‘wish 
list’ for regulatory cooperation, carries forward best practices from 
prior agreements such as “WTO-plus” features that go beyond the 
protections in the WTO agreement, and introduces other novel fea-
tures that raise food safety.  Innovations include a new due process 
panel, the ‘SPS Technical Consultation’ feature, a ‘Regulatory Co-
herence’ Chapter with an explicit call to encourage regulatory co-
operation, and a Market Access Chapter with special provisions 
addressing cooperation with respect to trade in biotechnology and 
food additives.  Through provisions and Chapters, the TPP pro-
vides for more regulatory cooperation—facilitating dialogue, in-
formation sharing, deliberative processes, consultation, interna-
tional standards, mutual recognition agreements—in ways that 
will raise food safety.      
While positive spillovers are likely to include adoption of high-
er standards to facilitate trade with Mega-Regional Members, and 
higher standards with countries outside of the agreement, negative 
externalities such as losses to regulatory innovation, transparency 
and strict scientific examination, are noted.  This is important as 
new agreements, provisions, and chapters, will be modeled after 
the TPP; a glimpse into the negotiations on the China-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement reveals many provisions, including safe-
guards to protect Australian labor upon Chinese investment, sim-
ilar to those found in the TPP.274  
 
 
Addendum: Since the inception of this Article, we have witnessed a 
noteworthy shift toward widespread popular discontent with the institu-
tions of international economic law, and their role in globalization. Recent 
events show that in the United States and Europe, the future of trade 
agreements is in doubt. In the United States, the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship talks are stalled with President-elect Donald Trump promising to 
withdraw the United States from TPP on his first day in office, and in 
Europe, ‘Brexit’ talks are escalating. While this tumultuous time may be 
difficult for international economic lawyers, it also represents an oppor-
tunity to openly discuss new agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Part-
                                                 
274 See Australian Lawmakers Review Possible Compromise for China Trade 
Deal Ratification, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., Bridges, Volume 
19, number 32. (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/
files/review/bridgesweekly19-34.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BC3-XWE4] (announc-
ing proposed changes to Australia’s Migration Act). 
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nership—balancing their strengths alongside their weaknesses.  Looking 
forward, this Article provides policymakers with a way to view the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, and others agreements like it—as vehicles aimed at 
cementing high standards on controversial issues related to food safety, 
across an increasingly important regional value chains, using new mech-
anisms for regulatory cooperation. 
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APPENDIX 
 









A complaint by the United States and 
Canada regarding the European Union 
ban on meat treated with growth pro-
moting hormones. 
Australia-Salmon Complaints by the United States and 
Canada against Australia’s restrictions 




A United States complaint to examine 
Japan’s requirement that each variety 
of certain fruits be tested with regard 
to the efficacy of fumigation treatment. 
Japan-Apples A United States complaint to examine 
Japan’s restriction on apples due to 
‘fire blight’. 
Australia-Fresh Fruit  
and Vegetable 
A Philippines complaint to examine  
Australia’s quarantine procedures. 
Australia-Quarantine  
Regime 
Complaints by the European Union 
against Australia’s quarantine proce-
dures. 
EU-Biotech Complaints by the United States, Can-
ada and Argentina concerning Euro-
pean Community measures affecting 
the approval and marketing of biotech 
products. 
US-Continued Suspension Complaints by the European Commu-
nity against the United States and 
Canada on their continued suspension 
of obligations relating to the EC-
Hormones dispute. 
Australia-Apples A New Zealand complaint to examine 
Australia’s restrictions on apples. 
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US-COOL Complaints by Canada and Mexico re-
garding the United States on the Cer-
tain Country of Origin Labeling Re-
quirements. 
US-Poultry A Chinese complaint to examine Unit-
ed States measures affecting imports of 
poultry. 
Korea-Bovine Meat  
(Canada) 
A Canadian complaint to examine Ko-
rea’s measures affecting the importa-












Food Safety Example 








2.) Dialogue  Informal exchange of 
information to foster 
mutual understanding 
Transatlantic  
Economic Council,     
Infosan 
3.) Procedural Soft Law  Cooperation among 
states based on non-
legally binding instru-
ments  




4.) Private codes Coordinated technical 







liance on Private Codes 
The incorporation of 
international private 
codes into national leg-
islative instruments 
Global Food Safety Initi-
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based on frequent in-
teraction by peers (not 
treaties)  
7.) Mutual Recognition 
Agreements  
In national regulatory 
law retaining different 
national standards but 
agreeing to allow mar-
ket access upon ap-








Multilateral accords to 
reduce regulatory bar-
riers to trade 
WTO 






10.) Formal Regulatory 
Partnerships  
 
Formal arrangements US-Canada Regulatory 
Cooperation Council 
11.) Integration and 
Harmonization Through 
a Given supranation-
al/Joint Institution  
Agreement to adopt the 
same regulatory stand-
ard in each national 
regulation  
U.S. federal legislation 
on food safety applied 
through member states. 
Or EU Directives.  
12.) Joint Regulator  A single regulatory 
agency to promulgate 
joint regulations with 
standards covering two 
or more jurisdictions 
The Joint Food Standards 
Australia and New Zea-
land 
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